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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO · -
CHARLES MURRAY, ADMINISTRATOR, 
Plaintiff 
v 
STA TE OF OHIO, 
Defendant 
INTRODUCTION 
CASE NO. 312322 
JUDGE R. SUSTER 
STATE OF OHIO'S 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
RE: APPLICABILITY OF 
EVID. R. 404 TO NON -
PARTIES AND RENEWED 
MOTION FOR LIMITING 
INSTRUSCTION 
REGARDING EBERLING 
CONVICTION OF 
MURDER OF ETHEL 
DURKIN 
Defendant has objected to admission of evidence of" other acts" presented by 
plaintiff for the purpose of incriminating Richard Eberling. Defendant's objections are 
based upon Evid. R. 404 which prohibits the use of character evidence to prove that an 
individual acted in conformity therewith. This court has questioned whether Evid. R. 
404 applies to third parties . As demonstrated below, it does. Defendant submits 
herewith its authority in support of a limiting instruction regarding Richard Eberling's 
conviction of the murder of Ethel Durkin. 
- LAW AND ARGUMENT 
-
-
The Ohio Supreme Court stated in 1998, "Evidence. R. 404, by its terms, applies to 
all character evidence, not simply to persons accused of crimes ... ", State v. Mason, 
(1998) 82 Ohio St.3d 144, at 160, Emphasis Added. The issue the court evaluated was 
the exclusion by the trial court of evidence of other acts of the victim's husband, whom 
the defendant (Mason) alleged had committed the murder. In finding that such evidence 
is properly excluded under Evid. R. 404, the court stated: 
"Exclusion from a murder trial of evidence of prior specific violent acts by the 
victim's husband, who defendant claimed was the killer, did not violate 
defendant's constitutional rights, where the evidence was inadmissible under the 
rule generally prohibiting character evidence", State v. Mason, supra, syllabus. 
Also it is clear that Evid. R. 404 fully applies to civil action. Tschantz v. Ferguson 
(Eighth District 1994) , 97 Ohio App.3d 693. 
Under the foregoing authority it is abundantly clear that Evid.R. 404 's prohibition 
against the use of character evidence in order to prove that a person acted in conformity 
therewith applies to all character evidence. Accordingly, defendant respectfully renews 
its motion for a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the conviction of Richard 
Eberling for the murder of Ethel Durkin. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Law Re: Applicability of Evid. R. 404 to 
Nonparties was served personally upon Terry Gilbert, counsel for plaintiff, in Court 
Room 20 B, Courts Tower, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
arilyn Cassidy 
Assistant Prosecutor 
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*144 82 Ohio St.3d 144 
694 N.E.2d 932 
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, 
v. 
MASON, Appellant. 
No. 97-239. 
Supreme Court of Ohio. 
Submitted Feb. 17, 1998. 
Decided June 17, 1998. 
Defendant was convicted of murder and other 
offenses and sentenced to death following a jury trial 
in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, and he 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Marion County, 
Evans, J., affirmed, and he appealed again. The 
Supreme Court, Moyer, C.J., held that: (1) denial of 
additional state-funded investigative and expert 
assistance was not error; (2) defendant was not in 
custody during two prearrest police-station interviews, 
and his statements were voluntary; (3) denial of 
continuance was not error; (4) no errors occurred 
during voir dire; (5) crime-scene and autopsy photos 
were admissible; (6) use of police-interview 
transcripts was not error; (7) evidence of prior 
specific violent acts by the victim's husband was 
properly excluded; (8) guilt-phase instructions were 
proper; (9) no prosecutorial misconduct occurred 
during cross-examination of defendant or in final 
arguments; (10) evidence supported conviction; (11) 
penalty-phase instructions were proper; (12) jury was 
not shown to be racially biased; (13) supplemental 
instruction urging further penalty-phase deliberations 
was properly given; (14) no jury misconduct was 
shown; (15) defense counsel was not ineffective; (16) 
aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating 
factors; and (17) death sentence was neither excessive 
nor disproportionate. 
Affirmed. 
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ~268.2(3) 
92 
92XII Due Process of Law 
92k256 
92k268.2 
Criminal Prosecutions 
Disadvantaged Persons, Counsel and 
Trial 
92k268.2(3) Indigents; transcript and financial 
aid. 
Ohio 1998. 
Due process, as guaranteed by the Federal and State 
Constitutions, requires that an indigent criminal 
defendant be provided funds to obtain expert 
assistance at state expense only where the trial court 
finds, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that the 
defendant has made a particularized showing (1) of a 
reasonable probability that the requested expert would 
aid in his defense, and (2) that denial of the requested 
expert assistance would result in an unfair trial. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; Const. Art. 1, § 16; 
R.C. § 2929.024; Superintendence Rule 20, subd. 
IV(D). 
2. COSTS ~302.2(2) 
102 
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions 
102k301.1 Security for Payment; Proceedings in 
Forma Pauperis 
102k302.2 Production of Witnesses or Evidence 
102k302.2(2) Expert witnesses or assistance in 
general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Indigent defendant was not entitled to a state-funded 
soil expert in a prosecution for murder of a victim 
found in a rural area, where at trial he repeatedly 
made the point that the state produced no evidence of 
dirt on his clothing, and where, even had a soil expert 
testified that the dirt on his shoes was inconsistent 
with the crime-scene dirt, the probative value would 
have been minimal at best, in that the police did not 
take the shoes for several days after the victim's 
disappearance. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; 
Const. Art. 1, § 16; R.C. § 2929.024; 
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D). 
3. COSTS ~302.2(2) 
102 
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions 
102k301.1 Security for Payment; Proceedings in 
Forma Pauperis 
102k302.2 Production of Witnesses or Evidence 
102k302.2(2) Expert witnesses or assistance in 
general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Indigent defendant was not entitled to a state-funded 
shoeprint expert in a murder prosecution in which the 
state used shoeprints found in the victim's car to 
support its theory that a struggle had taken place, 
where he did not make a particularized showing that a 
shoeprint expert might have rebutted that inference or 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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that a privately retained shoe expert would have been 
able to identify the shoeprints more specifically than 
could the state's experts. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5 
, 14; Const. Art. 1, § 16; R.C. § 2929.024; 
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D). 
4. CRIMINAL LAW <e::=1028 
110 
l lOXXIV Review 
1 lOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
llOXXIV(E)l In General 
l 10kl028 Presentation of questions in general. 
[See headnote text below] 
4. CRIMINAL LAW <e::=1045 
110 
1 lOXXIV Review 
11 OXXIV (E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
l lOXXIV (E) 1 In General 
l 10kl045 Necessity of ruling on objection or 
motion. 
Ohio 1998. 
Supreme Court will not ordinarily consider a claim 
of error that was not raised in any way in the Court of 
Appeals and was not considered or decided by that 
court. 
5. COSTS <e::=302.2(2) 
102 
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions 
102k301.1 Security for Payment; Proceedings in 
Forma Pauperis 
102k302.2 Production of Witnesses or Evidence 
102k302.2(2) Expert witnesses or assistance in 
general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Indigent murder defendant was not prejudiced by the 
trial court's refusal to provide a state-funded 
eyewitness-identification expert, and thus the refusal 
was not an abuse of discretion, where the state 
presented substantial evidence other than eyewitness 
identifications, defense counsel fully and adequately 
cross-examined each eyewitness, and defendant 
without state funds procured an eyewitness-
identification expert whose testimony the jury heard. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; Const. Art. 1, § 16; 
R.C. § 2929.024; Superintendence Rule 20, subd. 
IV(D). 
6. COSTS <e::=302.3 
102 
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions 
102k301. l Security for Payment; Proceedings in 
Forrna Pauperis 
102k302.3 Investigative assistance. 
Ohio 1998. 
Indigent murder defendant was not entitled to 
additional state funds to obtain a second investigator 
to critique the police investigation, where he did not 
raise more than a mere possibility that such an expert 
might have been relevant to the defense and he had 
already been allowed state funds for an expert 
investigator whose efforts helped produce over 30 
defense witnesses. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; 
Const. Art. 1, § 16; R.C. § 2929.024; 
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D). 
7. COSTS <e::=302.2(2) 
102 
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions 
102k301. l Security for Payment; Proceedings in 
Forrna Pauperis 
102k302.2 Production of Witnesses or Evidence 
102k302.2(2) Expert witnesses or assistance in 
general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Services of a state-funded mass-media expert were 
not reasonably necessary for proper representation or 
to guarantee the fairness of an indigent defendant's 
murder trial. U .S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; 
Const. Art. 1, § 16; R.C. § 2929.024; 
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D). 
8. COSTS <e::=302.2(2) 
102 
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions 
102k301. l Security for Payment; Proceedings in 
Forma Pauperis 
102k302.2 Production of Witnesses or Evidence 
102k302.2(2) Expert witnesses or assistance in 
general. 
Ohio 1998. 
*144 Indigent defendant's case would not have been 
helped by a state-funded firearms expert in a murder 
prosecution in which a state's expert testified that a 
metal piece found at the crime scene matched the 
characteristics of a revolver which the victim's 
husband owned and had apparently agreed to 
exchange with defendant for a television, and thus it 
was not an abuse of discretion to deny him such an 
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expert, where the state's evidence simply showed an 
observable similarity and was equally incriminating 
against the husband. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; 
Const. Art. 1, § 16; R.C. § 2929.024; 
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D). 
9. COSTS €:=302.4 
102 
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions 
102k301.1 Security for Payment; Proceedings in 
Forma Pauperis 
102k302.4 Medical or psychiatric witnesses or 
assistance. 
Ohio 1998. 
Indigent defendant failed to show a need for a state-
funded deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) statistical expert 
in a murder prosecution in which the state introduced 
DNA evidence, and thus the absence of one did not 
make his trial unfair, where he did not dispute the 
state's DNA test results. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5 
, 14; Const. Art. 1, § 16; R.C. § 2929.024; 
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D). 
10.COSTS €:=302.4 
102 
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions 
102k301.1 Security for Payment; Proceedings in 
Forma Pauperis 
102k302.4 Medical or psychiatric witnesses or 
assistance. 
Ohio 1998. 
Indigent murder defendant was not entitled to a 
state-funded forensic psychologist, where his mental 
status was not a central feature of the trial and where 
he was allowed a state-funded psychiatrist whose 
testimony he decided not to present for tactical 
reasons. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; Const. 
Art. 1, § 16; R.C. § 2929.024; Superintendence 
Rule 20, subd. IV(D). 
11. COSTS €:=302.2(2) 
102 
102XIV In Criminal Prosecutions 
102k301. l Security for Payment; Proceedings in 
Forma Pauperis 
102k302.2 Production of Witnesses or Evidence 
102k302.2(2) Expert witnesses or assistance in 
general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Indigent defendant was not entitled to the state-
funded assistance of a social worker or mitigation 
expert in the penalty phase of his murder trial, where 
his two lawyers and an investigator looked fully into 
his background, the state turned over voluminous 
records concerning him, and he deliberately chose not 
to present background mitigation evidence to avoid 
unfavorable rebuttal. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14 
Const. Art. 1, § 16; R.C. § 2929.024; 
Superintendence Rule 20, subd. IV(D). 
12.CRIMINAL LAW €:=414 
110 
l lOXVII Evidence 
1 lOXVII(M) Declarations 
110k41 l Declarations by Accused 
110k414 Proof and effect. 
Ohio 1998. 
Evidence supported finding that a murder suspect 
was not in custody, so as to trigger his right to a 
Miranda warning, during two prearrest police-station 
interviews. 
13.CRIMINAL LAW €:=412.2(2) 
110 
l lOXVII Evidence 
1 lOXVII(M) Declarations 
11Ok4l1 Declarations by Accused 
110k412.2 Right to Counsel; Caution 
110k412.2(2) Accusatory stage of proceedings. 
Ohio 1998. 
Only a custodial interrogation triggers the need for a 
Miranda warning. 
14.CRIMINAL LAW €:=412.2(2) 
110 
l lOXVII Evidence 
l lOXVII(M) Declarations 
110k41 l Declarations by Accused 
110k412.2 Right to Counsel; Caution 
110k412.2(2) Accusatory stage of proceedings. 
Ohio 1998. 
Fact that a suspect is being interviewed at a police 
station does not, per se, require a Miranda warning; 
rather, the determination as to whether a custodial 
interrogation has occurred requires an inquiry into 
how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would 
have understood his situation, with the ultimate 
inquiry being simply whether there is a formal arrest 
or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree 
associated with a formal arrest. 
15.CRIMINAL LAW €:=412.1(1) 
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110 
1 lOXVII Evidence 
1 lOXVII(M) Declarations 
11 Ok411 Declarations by Accused 
110k412. l Voluntary Character of Statement 
110k412. l(l) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Totality of circumstances showed the voluntariness 
of a murder suspect's professions of innocence during 
two pretrial police-station interviews, where he was a 
30-year-old high school graduate who had taken some 
college courses, had two prior felony convictions, was 
experienced with criminal investigations, was not 
threatened, mistreated, coerced, or wrongfully 
induced, was questioned for only 18 minutes in the 
first interview, and enjoyed substantial periods of 
inactivity during the second, four-hour interview. 
16.CRIMINAL LAW €:=412.1(1) 
110 
1 lOXVII Evidence 
1 lOXVII(M) Declarations 
110k411 Declarations by Accused 
110k412.1 Voluntary Character of Statement 
110k412. l(l) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Court determining whether a pretrial statement is 
involuntary should consider the totality of the 
circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior 
criminal experience of the accused; the length, 
intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence 
of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the 
existence of threat or inducement. 
17.CRIMINAL LAW €:=590(1) 
110 
1 lOXIX Continuance 
110k588 
110k590 
110k590(1) 
Grounds for Continuance 
Want of Preparation 
In general. 
[See headnote text below] 
17.CRIMINAL LAW €:=605 
110 
1 lOXIX Continuance 
110k602 Application and Affidavits for 
Continuance 
110k605 Time for making. 
Ohio 1998. 
Defendant was not wrongly denied a continuance on 
his claim that he needed more time to investigate and 
prepare for his murder trial, where he did not request 
one until eight days before trial, was represented by 
counsel for at least eight months before trial, received 
state funds for several investigators and experts, got 
additional help from the public defender's office, filed 
more than 50 pretrial motions, conducted several 
pretrial hearings, and called 31 trial witnesses. 
18.CRIMINAL LAW €:=586 
110 
1 lOXIX Continuance 
110k586 Discretion of court. 
Ohio 1998. 
Grant or denial of continuance is a matter entrusted 
to the broad, sound discretion of the trial judge. 
19.CRIMINAL LAW €:=1166.16 
110 
l lOXXIV Review 
1 lOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
1lOkl166.5 Conduct of Trial in General 
llOkl 166.16 Impaneling jury in general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Trial judge's and defense counsel's use during voir 
dire of the term "recommendation" in reference to a 
possible verdict of a life sentence in a murder trial, 
though error because a jury recommendation of a life 
sentence is binding on the trial court, was harmless 
error, where the use of the term was brief and the 
judge and counsel generally avoided it. 
20.JURY €:=131(6) 
230 
230V Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and 
Objections 
230k124 
230k131 
230k131(6) 
Challenges for Cause 
Examination of Juror 
Bias and prejudice. 
[See headnote text below] 
20.JURY €:=131(13) 
230 
230V Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and 
Objections 
230k124 Challenges for *144 Cause 
230k131 Examination of Juror 
230kl31(13) Mode of examination. 
Ohio 1998. 
Defendant accused of interracial murder had an 
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adequate opportunity to question prospective jurors on 
racial attitudes, where before trial each juror was 
given a 41-question, case-specific form which asked 
about background, experiences, and attitudes, the trial 
court allowed questioning about racial bias during 
individual voir dire though it wanted to defer 
extensive questioning until general voir dire, and 
defense counsel asked about racial attitudes during 
both individual and general voir dire, which extended 
into three days. R.C. § 2945.27; Rules Crim.Pree., 
Rule 24(A). 
21.JURY ~131(4) 
230 
230V Competency of Jurors, 
Objections 
Challenges, and 
230kl24 
230kl31 
230kl31(4) 
Ohio 1998. 
Challenges for Cause 
Examination of Juror 
Extent of examination. 
Scope of voir dire is within a trial court's discretion 
and varies with the circumstances. R.C. § 2945.27; 
Rules Crim.Pree., Rule 24(A). 
22.JURY ~131(6) 
230 
230V Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and 
Objections 
230kl24 
230kl31 
230kl31(6) 
Ohio 1998. 
Challenges for Cause 
Examination of Juror 
Bias and prejudice. 
Whether prospective jurors' racial attitudes should 
be covered in individual or general voir dire in an 
interracial capital case is within the trial court's 
discretion. R.C. § 2945.27; Rules Crim.Pree., Rule 
24(A). 
23.CRIMINAL LAW ~655(4) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
11 OXX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in 
General 
l10k654 
l10k655 
l 10k655(4) 
Remarks and Conduct of Judge 
In General 
Remarks in selecting jury. 
[See headnote text below] 
23.CRIMINAL LAW ~1166.22(2) 
110 
llOXXIV Review 
l lOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
l lOkl 166.5 Conduct of Trial in General 
l lOkl 166.22 Remarks of Judge 
1lOkl166.22(2) Nature of remarks in general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Trial court's remarks about the efficacy and 
propriety of the death penalty during voir dire in a 
murder trial were improper, but the error was 
harmless, where they were isolated remarks to single 
jurors, the defense did not object, and the jury was 
instructed to disregard any indication of the trial 
court's view of the facts or the case. 
24.CRIMINALLAW ~1144.15 
llO 
l lOXXIV Review 
l lOXXIV(M) Presumptions 
l 10k1144 Facts or Proceedings Not Shown by 
Record 
l 10k1144.15 Custody and conduct of jury. 
Ohio 1998. 
Unless it is proven otherwise, the jury is presumed 
to follow instructions. 
25.CRIMINAL LAW ~722.3 
llO 
llOXX Trial 
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
l 10k722 Comments on Character or Conduct 
l 10k722.3 Character, conduct, or appearance 
in general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor's reference to the "guilt phase" of the 
trial in individual voir dire of six prospective jurors 
did not create a presumption of guilt in a murder case, 
especially since three of them did not sit as jurors and 
the prosecutor explained to all that the first phase 
dealt with determining guilt or innocence. 
26.JURY ~131(1) 
230 
230V Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and 
Objections 
230kl24 
230kl31 
230kl31(1) 
Ohio 1998. 
Challenges for Cause 
Examination of Juror 
In general. 
During voir dire, the first phase of a bifurcated 
capital case may be referred to as the "guilt phase" as 
a convenient abbreviation, rather than using awkward 
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terms such as the "guilt or innocence phase" or 
"determination of guilt or innocence" phase. 
27.CRIMINAL LAW ~641.13(2.1) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
11 OXX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in 
General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
11 Ok64 l. l 3 Adequacy of Representation 
l 10k64 l.13(2) Particular Cases and Problems 
l 10k64 l.l 3 (2 .1) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Murder defendant failed to establish prejudice to 
support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
during jury selection, where his complaints mostly 
amounted to hindsight views about how current 
counsel might have conducted voir dire differently. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
28.CRIMINAL LAW ~641.13(1) 
110 
1 lOXX Trial 
l lOXX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in 
General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
l 10k64 l .13 Adequacy of Representation 
110k641.13(1) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Court evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel will not second-guess trial strategy decisions. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
29.CRIMINAL LAW ~641.13(1) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in 
General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
l 10k64 l. 13 Adequacy of Representation 
l 10k641.13(1) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Court evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel must indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
30.JURY ~33(5.20) 
230 
230II Right to Trial by Jury 
230k30 Denial or Infringement of Right 
230k33 Constitution and Selection of Jury 
230k33(5) Challenges and Objections 
230k33(5.20) Standing and waiver. 
Ohio 1998. 
Murder defendant waived his claim that the 
prosecution improperly used peremptory challenges to 
exclude prospective jurors based on their opposition to 
the death penalty when he failed to ask for the state's 
explanation. 
31.JURY ~33(5.15) 
230 
230II Right to Trial by Jury 
230k30 Denial or Infringement of Right 
230k33 Constitution and Selection of Jury 
230k33(5) Challenges and Objections 
230k33(5.15) Peremptory challenges. 
[See headnote text below] 
31.JURY ~135 
230 
230V 
230k134 
230k135 
Ohio 1998. 
Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and 
Objections 
Peremptory Challenges 
In general. 
Apart from excluding jurors based on race or sex, 
prosecutors can exercise a peremptory challenge for 
any reason, without inquiry, and without a court's 
control. 
32.JURY ~33(5.15) 
230 
230II Right to Trial by Jury 
230k30 Denial or Infringement of Right 
230k33 Constitution and Selection of Jury 
230k33(5) Challenges and Objections 
230k33(5.15) Peremptory challenges. 
Ohio 1998. 
Batson prohibition against peremptory strikes based 
solely on race does not extend to peremptory strikes 
against jurors opposed to the death penalty. 
33.CRIMINAL LAW ~438(6) 
110 
l lOXVII Evidence 
l lOXVII(P) Documentary Evidence 
110k431 Private Writings and Publications 
110k438 Photographs and Other Pictures 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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110k438(5) Depiction of Injuries or Dead 
Bodies 
110k438(6) Purpose of admission. 
[See headnote text below] 
33.CRIMINAL LAW ~675 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(C) Reception of Evidence 
110k675 Cumulative evidence in general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Six crime-scene photographs depicting the victim's 
battered, bruised, and disrobed body, with her jeans 
and panties pulled below her knees, were admissible 
in a murder prosecution, where they were probative 
of the state's theory that the victim struggled and was 
raped, illustrated coroner and police testimony, were 
small in size, and were not particularly gruesome or 
inflammatory, though two of them were cumulative. 
Rules of Evid., Rule 403. 
34.CRIMINAL LAW ~438(6) 
*144 110 
1 lOXVII Evidence 
1 lOXVII(P) Documentary Evidence 
110k431 Private Writings and Publications 
110k438 Photographs and Other Pictures 
110k438(5) Depiction of Injuries or Dead 
Bodies 
110k438(6) Purpose of admission. 
Ohio 1998. 
Three autopsy photographs portraying the victim's 
injuries were admissible in a murder prosecution, 
where they were relevant to prove intent to kill, 
illustrated coroner and police testimony, were small in 
size, and were not particularly gruesome or 
inflammatory. Rules of Evid., Rule 403. 
35.CRIMINAL LAW ~438(1) 
110 
1 lOXVII Evidence 
1 lOXVII(P) Documentary Evidence 
110k431 Private Writings and Publications 
110k438 Photographs and Other Pictures 
110k438(1) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Admission of photographs is left to a trial court's 
sound discretion. Rules of Evid., Rule 403. 
36.CRIMINAL LAW ~438(7) 
110 
1 lOXVII Evidence 
1 lOXVIl(P) Documentary Evidence 
110k431 Private Writings and Publications 
110k438 Photographs and Other Pictures 
110k438(7) Photographs arousing passion or 
prejudice; gruesomeness. 
Ohio 1998. 
Relevant, nonrepetitive photographs are admissible 
in capital cases, even if gruesome, as long as the 
probative value of each photograph outweighs the 
danger of material prejudice. Rules of Evid., Rule 
403. 
37.CRIMINAL LAW ~1168(2) 
110 
1 lOXXIV Review 
llOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
1lOkl168 Rulings as to Evidence in General 
1lOkl168(2) Reception of evidence. 
Ohio 1998. 
Though two of six otherwise admissible crime-scene 
photos were cumulative, the error in admitting both 
was harmless, in a prosecution for murder. Rules of 
Evid., Rule 403. 
38.CRIMINAL LAW ~1036.1(6) 
110 
1 lOXXIV Review 
l lOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
llOXXIV(E)l In General 
110kl036 Evidence 
110k1036.1 In General 
110kl036.1(3) Particular Evidence 
110k1036.1(6) Documentary evidence. 
Ohio 1998. 
State's use of transcripts, in addition to tapes, of 
police interviews portraying a black murder 
defendant's use of ethnic language was not plain 
error, where defendant did not claim that the 
transcripts were inaccurate and the jury knew about 
his occasional use of ethnic language from listening to 
the tapes. 
39.CRIMINAL LAW ~1043(3) 
110 
1 lOXXIV Review 
1 lOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
1 lOXXIV (E) 1 In General 
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110k1043 Scope and Effect of Objection 
110k1043(3) Adding to or changing grounds of 
objection. 
Ohio 1998. 
Black murder defendant waived error as to the 
state's use of transcripts, in addition to tapes, of 
police interviews accurately portraying his use of 
ethnic language, where he failed to object to use of 
the transcripts on this basis although he had the 
transcripts and knew of their intended use; had the 
issue been timely raised, revisions to the transcript 
might have been made. Rules of Evid., Rule 
103(A)(I). 
40.CRIMINAL LAW <e:=858(3) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(J) Issues Relating to Jury Trial 
110k858 Taking Papers or Articles to Jury 
Room 
I 10k858(3) Documents or demonstrative 
evidence. 
Ohio 1998. 
Transcripts of a murder defendant's police 
interviews could be allowed in the jury room even 
though tapes of the interviews had been admitted into 
evidence, where they were useful and easier to 
understand than the tapes and the court carefully 
instructed the jurors that they were merely a listening 
aid and were to be disregarded if they conflicted with 
the tapes. 
41.HOMICIDE <e:=178(1) 
203 
203VII Evidence 
203VIl(B) Admissibility in General 
203kl 78 Incriminating Others 
203kl 78(1) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Exclusion from a murder trial of evidence of prior 
specific violent acts by the victim's husband, who 
defendant claimed was the killer, did not violate 
defendant's constitutional rights, where the evidence 
was inadmissible under the rule generally prohibiting 
character evidence and defendant was allowed to 
present other evidence that tended to show the 
husband's criminal propensity, including questioning 
of the husband about his heavy drinking and his fights 
with the victim. Rules of Evid., Rules 404, 404(A). 
42.HOMICIDE <e:=178(1) 
203 
203VII Evidence 
203VIl(B) Admissibility in General 
203k178 Incriminating Others 
203kl78(1) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Evidence that the victim's husband had allegedly 
committed specific acts of violence was inadmissible 
in a murder trial under the rule generally prohibiting 
the use of character evidence to prove actions in 
conformity therewith. Rules of Evid., Rules 404, 
404(A). 
43.CRIMINAL LAW <e:=338(4) 
110 
1 lOXVII Evidence 
1 lOXVII(D) Facts in Issue and Relevance 
110k338 Relevancy in General 
110k338(4) Evidence as to acts, transactions, 
Ohio 1998. 
and occurrences to which accused is not 
a party. 
Rule generally prohibiting the use of character 
evidence to prove actions in conformity therewith 
applies to all character evidence, including that 
relating to witnesses or alternative suspects; it is not 
limited simply to persons accused of crimes. Rules of 
Evid., Rules 404, 404(A). 
44.CRIMINAL LAW <e:=1172.8 
110 
l lOXXIV Review 
1 lOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
I lOkll 72 Instructions 
1lOkl172.8 Effect of verdict or determination. 
Ohio 1998. 
Instructing the jury that it had to determine that 
defendant was not guilty of aggravated murder before 
considering whether he was guilty of murder was 
harmless error if it was error at all, where the jury 
found defendant guilty of raping the victim. 
45.CRIMINAL LAW <e:=l038.1(3.l) 
110 
l lOXXIV Review 
l lOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
llOXXIV(E)l In General 
110kl038 Instructions 
110kl038.1 Objections in General 
1 lOk 103 8. 1 (3) Particular Instructions 
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110kl038.1(3 .1) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
By failing to object at trial, defendant waived all but 
plain error as to an instruction which told the jury that 
it had to determine if defendant was not guilty of 
aggravated murder before considering whether he was 
guilty of murder. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 30(A). 
46.CRIMINAL LAW <P713 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
11 Ok713 In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Determination of whether improper remarks 
constitute prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct 
requires analysis as to (1) whether the remarks were 
improper, and (2) if so, whether the remarks 
prejudicially affected the accused's substantial rights. 
47.CRIMINAL LAW <P720(5) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
110k720 Comments on Evidence or 
Witnesses 
110k720(5) Credibility and character of 
witnesses. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor's comments during cross-examination of 
a murder defendant about inconsistencies between his 
pretrial statements and his trial testimony did not 
penalize defendant for exercising his rights or 
constitute *144 prosecutorial misconduct. 
48.CRIMINAL LAW <P1037.1(2) 
110 
llOXXIV Review 
1 lOXXIV (E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
1 lOXXIV (E) 1 In General 
110kl037 Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110kl037 .1 In General 
11 Okl037 .1 (2) Particular statements, 
arguments, and comments. 
Ohio 1998. 
Although the prosecutor may have denigrated 
defense counsel during final guilt-phase argument in a 
murder trial by remarking that counsel "tried to cloud 
the issues, tried to confuse," this was not plain error, 
where the prosecutor's argument when viewed in its 
total context was reasoned, logical, and not emotional. 
49.CRIMINAL LAW <P1037.1(2) 
110 
1 lOXXIV Review 
11 OXXIV (E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
1 lOXXIV(E)l In General 
110k1037 Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110kl037.1 In General 
110k1037 .1(2) Particular statements, 
arguments, and comments. 
Ohio 1998. 
By not objecting to any of the prosecutor's final 
guilt-phase argument, defendant waived all but plain 
error as to the prosecutor's remark during the 
argument that defense counsel "tried to cloud the 
issues, tried to confuse." Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 
52(B). 
SO.CRIMINAL LAW <P720(9) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
110k720 Comments on Evidence or 
Witnesses 
110k720(7) Inferences from and Effect of 
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions 
110k720(9) Homicide. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor during final guilt-phase argument in a 
murder trial could point out the weakness in defense 
claims that defendant and the victim were romantically 
involved. 
51.CRIMINAL LAW <P720(9) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
110k720 Comments on Evidence or 
Witnesses 
110k720(7) Inferences from and Effect of 
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions 
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110k720(9) Homicide. 
[See headnote text below] 
51.CRIMINAL LAW ~726 
110 
llOXX Trial 
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
l 10k726 Retaliatory statements and remarks. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor during final guilt-phase argument in a 
murder trial could remark on the inconsistency 
between defendant's attack on eyewitness testimony 
and his own reliance upon doubtful eyewitness 
testimony. 
52.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(6) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
l 10k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
l 10k720 Comments on Evidence or 
Witnesses 
110k720(6) Inferences from and effect of 
evidence in general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutors are entitled to latitude in closing 
argument as to what the evidence has shown and what 
inferences can reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence. 
53.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(9) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
l 10k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
l 10k720 Comments on Evidence or 
Witnesses 
11 Ok720(7) Inferences from and Effect of 
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions 
l 10k720(9) Homicide. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor's remark during final guilt-phase 
argument in a murder trial that the defendant's 
testimony that police planted his keys in the victim's 
car was "preposterous" was not improper, where 
crime-scene photographs and the ensuing disassembly 
of the car proved that police did not plant this 
evidence. 
54.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(6) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
l 10k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
l 10k720 Comments on Evidence or 
Witnesses 
l 10k720(6) Inferences from and effect of 
evidence in general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor may state his Oplllon during closing 
argument if it is based on the evidence presented at 
trial. 
55.CRIMINAL LAW ~719(3) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
l 10k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
l 10k719 Matters Not Sustained by Evidence 
110k719(3) Personal knowledge, opinion, or 
belief of counsel. 
[See headnote text below] 
55.CRIMINAL LAW ~726 
110 
llOXX Trial 
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k726 Retaliatory statements and remarks. 
Ohio 1998. 
Although the prosecutor improperly vouched for the 
police during final guilt-phase argument in a murder 
trial by asserting that they "did an outstanding job" in 
their investigation, the error was not prejudicial, 
particularly in light of defense counsel's repeated 
criticism of the police investigation. 
56.CRIMINAL LAW ~726 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k726 Retaliatory statements and remarks. 
[See headnote text below] 
56.CRIMINAL LAW ~728(2) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
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11 OXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k728 Objections and Exceptions 
110k728(2) Necessity. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor's statement during closing argument that 
is not supported by admitted evidence is not prejudical 
error, where it is short, oblique, and justified as a 
reply to defense arguments and elicits no 
contemporaneous objection. 
57.CRIMINAL LAW ~1037.1(1) 
110 
1 lOXXIV Review 
1 lOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
llOXXIV(E)l In General 
110kl037 Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k1037 .1 In General 
110kl037.l(l) Arguments and conduct in 
general. 
Ohio 1998. 
By failing to object to the prosecutor's 
during final penalty-phase argument, 
defendant waived all but plain error. 
Crim. Proc., Rule 52(B). 
58.CRIMINAL LAW ~723(2) 
110 
l lOXX Trial 
remarks 
murder 
Rules 
1 lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
l l0k722 Comments on Character or Conduct 
11 Ok723 Appeals to Sympathy or Prejudice 
110k723(2) Reference to character of offense. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor during final penalty-phase argument in a 
murder trial could legitimately refer to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, both to refute any 
suggestion that they were mitigating and to explain 
why the specified aggravating circumstance 
outweighed mitigating factors. 
59.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(9) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
l 10k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
110k720 Comments on Evidence or 
Witnesses 
11 Ok720(7) Inferences from and Effect of 
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions 
110k720(9) Homicide. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor during final penalty-phase argument in a 
murder trial could properly minimize the importance 
of defendant's good conduct in jail, his artistic ability, 
and family opinions that he should avoid the death 
penalty. 
60.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(9) 
110 
l lOXX Trial 
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
l 10k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
110k720 Comments on Evidence or 
Witnesses 
l 10k720(7) Inferences from and Effect of 
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions 
110k720(9) Homicide. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor during final penalty-phase argument in a 
murder trial could properly comment upon the paucity 
of relevant mitigating evidence. 
61.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(6) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
l 10k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
110k720 *144 Comments on Evidence or 
Witnesses 
l 10k720(6) Inferences from and effect of 
evidence in general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutors during final penalty-phase argument can 
urge the merits of their cause and legitimately argue 
that defense mitigation evidence is worthy of little or 
no weight. 
62.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(9) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
11 OXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
l 10k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
110k720 Comments on Evidence or 
Witnesses 
l 10k720(7) Inferences from and Effect of 
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions 
110k720(9) Homicide. 
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Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor during final penalty-phase argument in a 
murder trial could comment that defense explanations 
seemed "far fetched," where defendant relied upon 
residual doubt. 
63.CRIMINAL LAW ~726 
110 
llOXX Trial 
l lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k726 Retaliatory statements and remarks. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor during final penalty-phase argument can 
respond to issues raised by defendant. 
64.CRIMINAL LAW ~720(9) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
110k720 Comments on Evidence or 
Witnesses 
110k720(7) Inferences from and Effect of 
Evidence in Particular Prosecutions 
l 10k720(9) Homicide. 
Ohio 1998. 
Prosecutor during final penalty-phase argument in a 
murder trial did not exceed limits by noting that 
defendant made an unswom statement on which he 
could not be cross-examined. 
65.CRIMINAL LAW ~1144.13(3) 
110 
1 lOXXIV Review 
llOXXIV(M) Presumptions 
1lOkl144 Facts or Proceedings Not Shown by 
Record 
1lOkl144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence 
l lOkl 144.13(2) Construction of Evidence 
l 10k1144.13(3) Construction in favor of 
government, state, or prosecution. 
Ohio 1998. 
In a review for sufficiency following a conviction, 
the evidence must be considered in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution. 
66.CRIMINAL LAW ~741(1) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General 
110k733 
110k741 
Questions of Law or of Fact 
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
in General 
110k741(1) In general. 
[See headnote text below] 
66.CRIMINAL LAW ~742(1) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
l lOXX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General 
110k733 Questions of Law or of Fact 
110k742 Credibility of Witnesses 
110k742(1) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Weight to be given the evidence and the credibility 
of the witnesses is primarily for the trier of fact. 
67.HOMICIDE ~235 
203 
203VII Evidence 
203VIl(E) Weight and Sufficiency 
203k235 Commission of or attempt to commit 
other offense. 
[See headnote text below] 
67.HOMICIDE ~358(1) 
203 
203XI Sentence and Punishment 
203k358 Sentencing Procedure 
203k358(1) In general. 
[See headnote text below] 
67.RAPE ~51(3) 
321 
321II Prosecution 
321Il(B) Evidence 
321k50 Weight and Sufficiency 
321k51 In General 
321k51(3) Carnal knowledge. 
Ohio 1998. 
Evidence that defendant's semen was in the victim's 
body supported the element of sexual penetration for 
the offense of rape, the offense of aggravated felony-
murder based upon rape, and a death-penalty 
specification alleging rape. 
68.HOMICIDE ~235 
203 
203VII Evidence 
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203VIl(E) Weight and Sufficiency 
203k235 Commission of or attempt to commit 
other offense. 
[See headnote text below] 
68. HOMICIDE ~358(1) 
203 
203XI Sentence and Punishment 
203k358 Sentencing Procedure 
203k358(1) In general. 
[See headnote text below] 
68.RAPE ~51(4) 
321 
32111 Prosecution 
32lll(B) Evidence 
321k50 Weight and Sufficiency 
321k51 In General 
321k51(4) Force, nonconsent, and resistance. 
Ohio 1998. 
Evidence that there was a struggle in the victim's 
car, that her jeans and panties were found pulled 
down below her knees, and that she had been both 
strangled and beaten supported the element of force 
for the offense of rape, the offense of aggravated 
felony-murder based upon rape, and a death-penalty 
specification alleging rape. 
69.HOMICIDE ~234(8) 
203 
203VII Evidence 
203VIl(E) Weight and Sufficiency 
203k234 Commission of or Participation in Act 
by Accused 
203k234(8) Conclusiveness of particular 
circumstances. 
Ohio 1998. 
Testimony of the state's witnesses about defendant's 
activities on the day of the victim's disappearance 
supported the jury's conclusion that he was the one 
who battered and killed the victim, notwithstanding 
defendant's contrary testimony. 
70.CRIMINAL LAW ~1035(6) 
110 
l lOXXIV Review 
l lOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
llOXXIV(E)l In General 
110k1035 Proceedings at Trial in General 
110kl035(6) Summoning and impaneling jury. 
Ohio 1998. 
Preliminary voir dire instructions which stated that a 
sentencing hearing would be held if defendant were 
found guilty, but did not further explain how the jury 
would determine whether to recommend death and 
implied that a finding of guilty on any charge could 
warrant the death penalty, was not plain error. 
71.CRIMINAL LAW ~1035(6) 
110 
l lOXXIV Review 
l lOXXIV (E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
l lOXXIV (E) 1 In General 
110kl035 Proceedings at Trial in General 
110kl035(6) Summoning and impaneling jury. 
Ohio 1998. 
By not contemporaneously objecting to preliminary 
voir dire instructions, defendant waived all but plain 
error. 
72.CRIMINAL LAW ~822(1) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, 
and Sufficiency 
110k822 Construction and Effect of Charge as 
a Whole 
110k822(1) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Failure of penalty-phase instructions to define the 
term "mitigating factors" was not error, where the 
instructions, considered as a whole, adequately guided 
the jury and did not restrict its consideration of 
mitigating evidence. 
73.CRIMINAL LAW ~1137(2) 
110 
l lOXXIV Review 
l lOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
l lOkl 135 Parties Entitled to Allege Error 
l lOkl 137 Estoppel 
l lOkl 137(2) Error committed or invited by 
party complaining in general. 
[See headnote text below] 
73.HOMICIDE ~358(1) 
203 
203XI Sentence and Punishment 
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203k358 Sentencing Procedure 
203k358(1) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Penalty-phase jury could consider testimony and 
exhibits admitted into evidence in the guilt phase, 
especially since defendant invited reconsideration of 
all guilt-phase evidence by relying upon residual doubt 
in arguing against the death penalty. 
74.HOMICIDE ~311 
203 
203VIII Trial 
203VIIl(C) Instructions 
203k31 l Punishment. 
Ohio 1998. 
Penalty-phase instruction telling the jury that 
defendant's right to appeal would not be limited by a 
death sentence and that the jury should not consider 
the subject of appeal was appropriate, where 
defendant provoked the instruction with his unsworn 
statement declaring his wish to receive a life sentence 
"so I will have a chance to bring this to Appeal 
Courts." 
75.HOMICIDE ~325 
203 
203X Appeal and Error 
203k325 Presentation and reservation in lower 
court of grounds of review. 
Ohio 1998. 
References in penalty-phase instructions *144 to 
"aggravating circumstances" when only a single 
aggravating circumstance existed was not plain error, 
particularly since the trial court identified for the jury 
a single aggravating circumstance of felony-murder. 
76.HOMICIDE ~311 
203 
203VIII Trial 
203VIII(C) Instructions 
203k3 l l Punishment. 
Ohio 1998. 
Penalty-phase instruction on mercy need not be 
given. 
77.CRIMINAL LAW ~796 
110 
llOXX Trial 
l lOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, 
and Sufficiency 
l 10k796 Punishment. 
Ohio 1998. 
Penalty-phase instruction on residual doubt need not 
be given. 
78.CRIMINAL LAW ~956(13) 
110 
l lOXXI Motions for New Trial 
l 10k948 Application for New Trial 
l 10k956 Affidavits and Other Proofs in 
General 
110k956(13) Sufficiency of proofs as to 
misconduct of or affecting jurors. 
Ohio 1998. 
Evidence that some members of an all-white jury 
made racist remarks did not show that the jury was 
racially prejudiced or that the defendant, who was 
black, was denied a fair trial, where the overall record 
suggested that any such remarks were isolated and 11 
jurors gave affidavits denying that they had 
participated in or observed any racism. 
79.CRIMINAL LAW ~865(1.5) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
l lOXX(J) Issues Relating to Jury Trial 
l 10k865 Urging or Coercing Agreement 
110k865(1.5) "Allen," "dynamite," or 
"hammer," etc., charge. 
Ohio 1998. 
After the trial court learned that the penalty-phase 
jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, it did 
not have to tell the jury to limit itself to life-sentence 
options, and could instead give a modified Howard 
charge urging the jury to continue deliberations, 
where the jury had been deliberating for only four and 
one-half hours and the circumstances did not show an 
irreconcilable deadlock. 
SO.CRIMINAL LAW ~872.5 
110 
1 lOXX Trial 
l lOXX(K) Verdict 
l 10k872.5 Assent of required number of jurors. 
Ohio 1998. 
When a jury becomes irreconcilably deadlocked 
during its capital sentencing deliberations, the trial 
court must impose an appropriate life sentence. 
81.CRIMINAL LAW ~865(1.5) 
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110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(J) Issues Relating to Jury Trial 
l 10k865 Urging or Coercing Agreement 
110k865(1.5) "Allen," "dynamite," or 
"hammer," etc., charge. 
Ohio 1998. 
No exact line can be drawn as to how long a 
penalty-phase jury must deliberate before the trial 
court should instruct it to limit itself to the life 
sentence options or take the case away from the jury; 
each case must be decided based upon the particular 
circumstances. 
82.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ~268(11) 
92 
92XII Due Process of Law 
92k256 Criminal Prosecutions 
92k268 Trial 
92k268(2) Particular Cases and Problems 
92k268(1 l) Instructions. 
Ohio 1998. 
Supplemental instructions urging jurors who are 
considering the death penalty to continue deliberations 
to try to reach a unanimous verdict do not violate due 
process. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
83.CRIMINAL LAW ~956(13) 
110 
1 lOXXI Motions for New Trial 
110k948 Application for New Trial 
110k956 Affidavits and Other Proofs in 
General 
110k956(13) Sufficiency of proofs as to 
misconduct of or affecting jurors. 
Ohio 1998. 
Defendant's evidence at a posttrial hearing on his 
motion for a new trial showed no prejudice from 
asserted misconduct by the penalty-phase jury. Rules 
Crim.Proc., Rule 33(A). 
84.CRIMINAL LAW ~957(3) 
110 
1 lOXXI Motions for New Trial 
110k948 Application for New Trial 
l 10k957 Statements, Affidavits, and Testimony 
of Jurors 
110k957(3) Misconduct of jurors, in general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Defendant could not inquire into the deliberations of 
the penalty-phase jury to support his posttrial motion 
for a new trial on the ground of jury misconduct, 
where he presented no evidence of outside influences 
so as to avoid the aliunde rule of evidence. Rules of 
Evid., Rule 606(B). 
85.CRIMINAL LAW ~957(1) 
110 
1 lOXXI Motions for New Trial 
110k948 Application for New Trial 
110k957 Statements, Affidavits, and Testimony 
of Jurors 
110k957(1) In general. 
Ohio 1998. 
Aliunde rule, which limits evidence about jury 
deliberations, has no exception for murder cases. 
Rules of Ev id., Rule 606(B). 
86.CRIMINAL LAW ~641.13(6) 
110 
1 lOXX Trial 
llOXX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in 
General 
11 Ok641 Counsel for Accused 
11 Ok641.13 Adequacy of Representation 
110k641.13(2) Particular Cases and Problems 
110k641.13(6) Evidence; procurement, 
presentation and objections. 
Ohio 1998. 
Murder defendant's counsel was not ineffective for 
telling the jury that defendant was on parole when he 
was arrested and that his parole was thereafter 
revoked, where the disclosure may have served the 
tactical purpose of supporting a "rush to judgment" 
theory and the state inevitably would have proved 
defendant's felony convictions. U .S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
87.CRIMINAL LAW ~641.13(7) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in 
General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
11Ok64l.l3 Adequacy of Representation 
110k641.13(2) Particular Cases and Problems 
110k641.13(7) Post-trial procedure and review. 
Ohio 1998. 
Murder defendant's counsel was not ineffective 
during the penalty phase for failing to present 
mitigating evidence concerning defendant's life history 
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and psychological background, where counsel made 
the strategic decision to withhold the evidence to 
avoid damaging rebuttal evidence including 
defendant's criminal and juvenile histories. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
88.CRIMINAL LAW ~641.13(7) 
110 
llOXX Trial 
1 lOXX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in 
General 
l 10k641 Counsel for Accused 
11 Ok64 l. l 3 Adequacy of Representation 
110k641.13(2) Particular Cases and Problems 
110k641.13(7) Post-trial procedure and review. 
Ohio 1998. 
Murder defendant's counsel was not ineffective 
during the penalty phase for making the strategic 
decision to refrain from presenting the video 
deposition of a psychiatrist in order to avoid rebuttal 
evidence about defendant's behavioral problems, 
character deficiencies, and poor potential for 
rehabilitation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
89.HOMICIDE ~357(4) 
203 
203XI Sentence and Punishment 
203k355 Death Penalty 
203k357 Considerations Determining Propriety 
of Death Sentence 
203k357(4) Aggravation or mitigation in 
general. 
[See headnote text below] 
89.HOMICIDE ~357(7) 
203 
203XI Sentence and Punishment 
203k355 Death Penalty 
203k357 Considerations Determining Propriety 
of Death Sentence 
203k357(7) Commission of other offense. 
Ohio 1998. 
Felony-murder aggravating circumstance, namely, 
that the defendant had raped, strangled, and fatally 
beaten his victim, outweighed the mitigating factors, 
which consisted of his family members' love for him, 
his possible artistic talent, and his adjustment to jail; 
thus, a death sentence was appropriate. 
90.HOMICIDE ~357(7) 
203 
203XI Sentence and Punishment 
203k355 Death Penalty 
203k357 Considerations Determining Propriety 
of Death Sentence 
203k357(7) Commission of other offense. 
Ohio 1998. 
Death sentence was neither excessive nor 
disproportionate punishment for a defendant who was 
convicted of *144 raping, strangling, and fatally 
beating his victim and who presented minimal 
mitigating factors. 
SYUABUS BY THE COURT 
Due process, as guaranteed by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution, requires that an indigent criminal 
defendant be provided funds to obtain expert 
assistance at state expense only where the trial court 
finds, in the *145 exercise of a sound discretion, that 
the defendant has made a particularized showing (1) 
of a reasonable probability that the requested expert 
would aid in his defense, and (2) that denial of the 
requested expert assistance would result in an unfair 
trial. (State v. Broom [1988], 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533 
N .E.2d 682, approved and followed.) 
[694 N.E.2d 940] On February 13, 1993, sheriff's 
deputies found the battered body of nineteen-year-old 
Robin Dennis inside an abandoned building in a rural 
area of Marion County near Pole Lane Road. Robin, 
lying face down, was wearing only a bra. Her jeans 
and panties were positioned around her ankles and 
lower leg. Eight feet from Robin's body detectives 
found her jacket, with burrs and debris on it. Her T-
shirt and car keys were under the coat. 
The apparent murder weapon, a blood-stained board 
with protruding nails, was lying some twenty feet 
from her body. Hair adhering to another piece of 
wood found at the scene matched Robin's hair. 
After an autopsy, pathologist Dr. Keith Norton 
concluded that Robin died as a result of blunt force 
trauma causing multiple skull fractures. Dr. Norton 
found eight distinct lacerations on Robin's head. 
Robin also suffered a black eye and bruises on her 
head, face, and body. She had been strangled, 
possibly causing unconsciousness, but she did not die 
of strangulation. In Dr. Norton's view, the blood-
stained board found at the scene could have caused 
her injuries, but some injuries may also have been 
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caused by the butt of a revolver. 
Dr. Norton found no trauma to the victim's 
genitalia, but he found sperm in her vagina. He 
testified that sperm can remain six to twelve hours 
after intercourse in the vagina of a woman doing 
normal activities. 
According to DNA experts called by the state, 
material taken with vaginal swabs from the victim 
matched the DNA of appellant Maurice Mason. As to 
this material, a DNA match could be expected from 
only one in eight thousand three hundred people of the 
same race as Mason. DNA material from Robin's 
panties also matched Mason's DNA, and the odds 
against a similar DNA match among individuals of his 
race were four million to one. Roughly comparable 
odds existed as to other races. Experts did not find [ 
694 N.E.2d 941] DNA from anyone other than the 
victim and Mason. 
Dr. Richard Durbin, the coroner who examined the 
body at the scene, believed Robin had been killed at 
the scene and had been dead for several days. From 
*146 her appearance and injuries, Dr. Durbin 
thought Robin had been raped or sexually molested. 
Robin's body was found within eighteen minutes' 
walking distance of where her abandoned car had 
been found stuck in a farm field three days earlier. 
On the inside of the passenger door, a police 
technician found type B blood, Robin's blood type. 
On the outside passenger car door and on the 
passenger's side of the dash, a forensic investigator 
found what appeared to be chevron style tennis shoe 
impressions. The state established that Mason owned 
shoes bearing similar chevron designs and that Robin 
Dennis's shoes with a similar chevron design were 
found at the crime scene. The prosecutor later argued 
that the location of the marks and blood inside the car 
were consistent with a struggle having taken place in 
and around the car. 
A set of keys, including car keys that fit a 1981 
Chrysler belonging to Mason's wife, were on the 
car's front passenger seat. 
Thomas Forster, a farmer, testified that he saw a 
person fitting Mason's description walking in his 
fields towards Pole Lane Road around 4: 10 p.m. on 
February 8, the date of Robin's disappearance. That 
location was a seven-to-nine-minute walk from the 
building where Robin's body was later found, and 
approximately a seventy-minute walk from where 
Mason lived. The man Forster observed was black, 
weighed about two hundred pounds, and was wearing 
jeans, a jacket, and a bandanna on his head. Mason is 
black, weighed two hundred fifteen pounds, and was 
wearing a bandanna earlier that day. 
Around 4: 15 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Jack Lautenslager 
noticed a black man walking along Pole Lane Road. 
The man was wearing a dark jacket and a blue 
bandanna with white specks. Lautenslager later 
identified Mason as the man he saw on February 8 by 
choosing his photo from a group of five or six photos. 
Around 4:30 p.m. that same afternoon, Francis 
Forster, Jr., farmer Forster's brother, noticed a light-
colored compact car in a field near New Road. Two 
days later, on February 10, Forster saw sheriff's 
deputies inspecting the same car, still in the field. 
On February 15, detectives found a small blood-
stained piece of metal at the crime scene. A firearms 
examiner concluded that this piece of metal was 
identical in size, shape, and design to a grip-frame 
from a Colt .22 caliber Frontier Scout Revolver and 
was consistent with having come from the handle of 
such a revolver. A similar weapon had been the 
subject of an agreement between Robin's husband and 
Mason under which the gun would be traded for 
Mason's television. 
*147 A technician found type B blood, Robin's 
blood type, on the side of a tennis shoe Mason was 
wearing on February 12. Approximately eleven 
percent of Caucasians and twenty percent of blacks 
have type B blood. 
Trial testimony established Robin's activities prior to 
her death. On February 7, Robin and her husband, 
Chris Dennis, drove to the home of friends Mike and 
Carol Young in Marion and stayed overnight. Chris 
brought a Colt .22 caliber Frontier Scout revolver 
with him. 
On February 8, Robin and Chris went to the Marion 
office of H & R Block. Later they stopped at the 
home of Rick McDuffie, whom Chris knew. Mason, 
who was acquainted with the victim's husband and 
was McDuffie's cousin, also was present at the 
McDuffie house. According to the testimony of 
several state witnesses, Robin, Chris and Mason later 
returned together to the Young house. 
While there, Chris and Mason discussed trading 
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Chris's Colt revolver for Mason's TV. State witnesses 
testified that Mason and Robin left the Youngs' house 
in Robin's car around 3:00 p.m. on February 8 to 
pick up Mason's television set. Before Robin and 
Mason left, Chris passed out intoxicated in the living 
room of the Youngs' house and did not awake until 
later that evening after they were gone. 
[694 N.E.2d 942] Robin never returned, and Chris 
Dennis's gun was never seen again. Despite Mason's 
admission that he discussed trading his television for 
the gun with Chris, he claimed that the trade never 
occurred and that he never had the gun. 
Mason's testimony as to his activities on the date of 
Robin's disappearance conflicted with that of the 
state's witnesses. Mason testified that he first met 
Robin in September 1992, and that they had spent a 
night together and engaged in consensual sex. He 
claimed that they had had sex a few times since then. 
He testified that on the date Robin disappeared, he 
had consensual sex with her around 10:30 a.m. at 
Rick McDuffie's house, and that later Chris and 
Robin dropped him off at his home around 3:00 p.m., 
after which he went walking, and that he never saw 
Robin after that. 
Mason said that between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m. on that 
day, he visited Gerald Gorham at a laundromat, and 
drank with him at a park. Gorham corroborated 
Mason's visit, but did not know on which day it 
occurred. 
Sandy Childers testified that she saw Mason after 
5:00 p.m., when he was out walking, then picked him 
up around 5:20 p.m. and drove him to his home. 
Mason later walked over to Sandy's, where he spent 
the evening, and others confirmed that Mason arrived 
at Sandy's between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. 
Mason admitted that he had initially told police that 
he was home after 2:30 p.m. on February 8, and that 
when his wife came home at 4: 15 p.m., they went to 
*148 the YMCA. He also initially denied to police 
that he had ever been alone with Robin. 
At trial Mason admitted that the keys discovered in 
Robin's abandoned vehicle were his, but claimed that 
police took them from him when he was taken into 
custody on February 12, 1993. Police inventory 
records, however, indicated that Mason had no keys 
with him on February 12. 
Moreover, February 10 photos of the car's interior 
indicate that Mason's keys were the keys found in 
Robin's car that day. Also, on February 11, police 
towed the car to a city garage and, on February 12, 
disassembled the car (door, seats and dash removed). 
Since the car was never reassembled, the photos could 
not have been taken after the February 12 
disassembly. 
Mason claimed that he did not, on February 8, wear 
the tennis shoes introduced as evidence by the state. 
He testified that his brothers and father had also worn 
his shoes. He theorized that the blood found on his 
shoe might have come from his father. He testified 
that he had previously worked at a slaughterhouse, 
and he speculated that the blood may have come from 
coworkers at a slaughterhouse who had cut themselves 
and might have bled on his shoes. 
Mason denied that he had been in the vicinity of the 
crime scene on February 8, and denied killing Robin. 
On cross-examination, Mason asserted, "I didn't kill 
her, and her husband [Chris Dennis] did. I know 
that. You know that, and everybody else knows 
that." 
In 1984, Mason had been convicted of burglary and 
thus had a prior conviction for an offense of violence 
and could not legally possess firearms. In 1988, 
Mason was also convicted of drug trafficking. 
Mason was indicted, tried by jury, and convicted of 
aggravated felony murder, rape, and having a weapon 
while under disability. He was further found guilty of 
the death-penalty specification of committing murder 
in the course of a rape, and further specifications 
involving firearms, prior felony, and prior offense of 
violence. Thereafter the jury returned a 
recommendation that he be sentenced to death, and 
that recommendation was accepted by the trial court. 
The court of appeals affirmed Mason's convictions 
and death sentence, and the cause is now before this 
court upon an appeal as of right. 
Jim Slagle, Marion County Prosecuting Attorney, 
for appellee. 
William F. Kluge, Lima, and David C. Stebbins, 
Columbus, for appellant. 
MOYER, Chief Justice. 
Mason has raised twenty-two propositions of law. 
We have reviewed each, and, for the reasons stated 
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below, we find that none justifies[694 N.E.2d 943] 
*149 reversal of Mason's convictions. We have 
fulfilled our responsibilities to independently review 
the record, weigh the aggravating circumstances 
against the mitigating factors, and examine the 
proportionality of a sentence of death in this case. 
Upon full review of the record, we affirm Mason's 
convictions and death sentence. 
Denial of Experts 
Mason argues that the trial court violated his 
constitutional and statutory rights by failing to provide 
adequate funds for investigative and expert assistance, 
despite the fact that he was provided funds for 
obtaining the services of a private investigator, a 
forensic psychiatrist, and a forensic pathologist, and 
for blood and DNA testing. He contends that the trial 
court should have also provided funds to enable him 
to hire (a) a soils and trace evidence expert, (b) an 
expert on shoeprints, (c) an eyewitness identification 
expert, (d) a social worker or mitigation expert, (e) a 
homicide investigation expert, (f) a mass media 
expert, (g) a forensic psychologist, (h) a statistical 
DNA expert, and (i) a firearms expert. 
[l] As a matter of due process, indigent defendants 
are entitled to receive the "raw materials" and the " 
'basic tools of an adequate defense,' " which may 
include provision of expert psychiatric assistance. 
Ake v. Oklahoma (1985), 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S.Ct. 
1087, 1093, 84 L.Ed.2d 53, 62 (quoting Britt v. North 
Carolina [1971), 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 
433-434, 30 L.Ed.2d 400, 403). The Ake court held 
that provision of an expert to a defendant was 
required when necessary to prepare an effective 
defense based on his mental condition, when his 
sanity at the time is seriously in question. 
While Ake involved the provision of expert 
psychiatric assistance only, the case now is generally 
recognized to support the proposition that due process 
may require that a criminal defendant be provided 
other types of expert assistance when necessary to 
present an adequate defense. Pursuant to Ake, it is 
appropriate to consider three factors in determining 
whether the provision of an expert witness is required: 
(1) the effect on the defendant's private interest in the 
accuracy of the trial if the requested service is not 
provided, (2) the burden on the government's interest 
if the service is provided, and (3) the probable value 
of the additional service and the risk of error in the 
proceeding if the assistance is not provided. Ake at 
78-79, 105 S.Ct. at 1093-1094, 84 L.Ed.2d at 63. 
Pursuant to the third of these factors, due process 
does not require the provision of expert assistance 
relevant to an issue that is not likely to be significant 
at trial. Nor does due process require that an indigent 
defendant be provided all the assistance that a 
wealthier counterpart might buy. Rather, he or she is 
entitled only to the basic and integral tools necessary 
to ensure a fair trial. 
*150 Due process, as guaranteed by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution, does not require the government to 
provide expert assistance to an indigent defendant in 
the absence of a particularized showing of need. Nor 
does it require the government to provide expert 
assistance to an indigent criminal defendant upon 
mere demand of the defendant. We observed in State 
v. Broom (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 283, 533 
N.E.2d 682, 691, that, pursuant to Ake and its 
progeny, in order to establish a violation of due 
process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, " 'a 
defendant must show more than a mere possibility of 
assistance from an expert. Rather, a defendant must 
show a reasonable probability that an expert would aid 
in his defense, and that denial of expert assistance 
would result in an unfair trial.' " Quoting Little v. 
Armantrout (C.A.8, 1987), 835 F.2d 1240, 1244. 
Further, as a matter of statutory law, R.C. 2929.024 
requires trial judges to grant funds in aggravated 
murder cases for investigative services and experts 
when "reasonably necessary for the proper 
representation" of indigent defendants. Such 
decisions are to be made "in the sound discretion of 
the court" based upon "(1) the value of the expert 
assistance to the defendant's proper representation * * 
* and (2) the availability [694 N .E.2d 944) of 
alternative devices that would fulfill the same 
functions." State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 
164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N .E.2d 264, paragraph four of 
the syllabus. See, also, Sup.R. 20(IV)(D). 
Accordingly, we hold that due process, as 
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution and Section 16, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution, requires that an 
indigent criminal defendant be provided funds to 
obtain expert assistance at state expense only where 
the trial court finds, in the exercise of a sound 
discretion, that the defendant has made a 
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particularized showing (1) of a reasonable probability 
that the requested expert would aid in his defense, and 
(2) that denial of the requested expert assistance 
would result in an unfair trial. 
In applying these principles to the case before us, 
we conclude that Mason has not demonstrated that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying him some 
funds for experts while allowing other funds. 
[2] Soils Expert. Mason did not demonstrate a 
particularized need for a soils expert. At trial, Mason 
repeatedly made his primary point, namely, that the 
state produced no evidence of dirt or debris on his 
clothing showing that he had been walking through 
farm fields four days before. Mason did not need a 
soils expert to make that point. 
Even had a soils expert testified that dirt on Mason's 
shoes was not consistent with dirt found at the crime 
scene, the probative value of that evidence would have 
been minimal at best, in that the shoes were not taken 
by the police for *151 several days after Robin's 
disappearance. Hence, Mason did not show that the 
fairness of his trial was dependent upon being 
provided a soils expert. State v. Broom (1988), 40 
Ohio St.3d 277, 283, 533 N .E.2d 682, 691. 
[3] Shoeprint Expert. Mason claims that the trial 
court erred in not granting his untimely request, made 
on the sixth day of trial, for a shoeprint expert. A 
police technician found impressions of a chevron 
design, possibly a shoeprint, on the Buick's dashboard 
and passenger door, which suggested a struggle. Both 
the victim and Mason wore tennis shoes with chevron 
soles, although the impressions were too faint to trace 
to any particular shoe. 
Both the state and the defense acknowledged, 
however, that Mason and Robin had both been in the 
car on February 8. The state argued that the 
shoeprints were relevant because they tended to 
support the state's contention that a struggle had taken 
place in the car. Mason did not make a particularized 
showing that a shoeprint expert might have rebutted 
that inference or that a privately retained shoe expert 
would have been able to identify the shoeprints more 
specifically than could the state's experts. 
[4] In the court of appeals, Mason complained only 
of the trial court's failure to provide him with a soils 
expert and a shoeprint expert. This court "will not 
ordinarily consider a claim of error that was not 
raised in any way in the Court of Appeals and was not 
considered or decided by that court." State v. 
Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 0.0.3d 98, 
364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
However, upon review in this capital case, we 
conclude that Mason's remaining claims as to funds 
for experts not pursued before the court of appeals 
also lack merit whether viewed on a plain-error basis 
or as a claimed abuse of discretion. 
[5] Eyewitness Identification Expert. A trial court 
can legitimately refuse funds for an expert absent "a 
showing of demonstrable prejudice." State v. Broom, 
40 Ohio St.3d at 284, 533 N.E.2d at 691. Mason 
made no such showing. The state did not rely solely 
on eyewitness identifications to link Mason to the 
murder of Robin Dennis. Rather the state presented 
other substantial evidence connecting Mason to those 
crimes. 
Defense counsel was able to fully and adequately 
cross-examine each of the eyewitnesses (Deputy 
Lautenslager, Francis Forster, and Thomas Forster), 
and thereby cast doubt on the accuracy of their 
recollections. Moreover, Mason did procure an 
expert on eyewitness identification without state 
funds. Because the jury heard his testimony and 
nevertheless convicted Mason, the trial [694 N .E.2d 
945] court's refusal to provide funds for such an 
expert was harmless. 
The trial court acted within its discretion in denying 
funds for an expert on eyewitness identification to 
assist the defense in challenging the validity of the 
*152 eyewitnesses' identification of Mason as the 
black male in the area of Robin's car on February 8. 
[6] Homicide Investigation Expert. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant 
additional funds for the defense to obtain a second 
investigator for the purpose of critiquing the police 
investigation. Such funds were not necessary to 
ensure the fairness of Mason's trial, nor did Mason's 
request point to more than a mere possibility that such 
an expert might have been relevant to the defense. 
The trial court did allow funds for an expert 
investigator, and his investigation helped to produce 
over thirty defense witnesses in the trial phase. 
[7] Mass Media Expert. The services of a mass 
media expert were not reasonably necessary for 
proper representation or to guarantee the fairness of 
Mason's trial. See State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 
193, 15 OBR at 336, 473 N.E.2d at 292 (sociologist 
to assist voir dire unnecessary); State v. Landrum 
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(1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 117, 559 N.E.2d 710, 723 
(psychologist for jury selection unnecessary). 
[8] Firearms Expert. Mason did not make a 
particularized showing of need for a firearms expert. 
A state expert witness did testify that a piece of metal 
found at the crime scene matched the characteristics 
of the grip-frame from a Colt revolver. Chris Dennis 
had such a gun, and the evidence indicates he had 
agreed to trade it to Mason for a television. 
But testimony from a traditional firearms expert 
would not have helped Mason. The compelling 
evidence on this point was simply the observable 
similarity between the crime-scene piece of metal and 
a grip frame from a Colt revolver, as well as a 
comparison photograph of the two items. Moreover, 
that evidence could equally incriminate Chris Dennis, 
and thus support the defense claim that Chris 
murdered his wife. Again, Mason failed to 
demonstrate an abuse of discretion. 
[9] DNA Statistical Expert. Mason failed to 
demonstrate a need for a DNA statistical expert. 
Ultimately, Mason did not dispute the DNA test 
results. Provision of a DNA statistical expert would 
have been superfluous, and the absence of one did not 
render the trial unfair. 
[10} Forensic Psychologist. Mason also failed to 
demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the denial of 
funds for a defense forensic psychologist. Cf. State v. 
Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 256-258, 552 
N.E.2d 191, 194-195; State v. Esparza (1988), 39 
Ohio St.3d 8, 529 N.E.2d 192. Mason's mental 
status was not a central feature of the trial, as in Ake 
v. Oklahoma. Mason did secure the services of a 
psychiatrist, at state expense, although he decided, for 
tactical reasons, not to present that testimony. 
[11] Social Worker/Mitigation Expert. Nor was 
Mason entitled to the assistance of a social worker or 
mitigation expert in the penalty phase as he claims. 
See State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 
427-428, 653 N.E.2d 253, 267. The defense *153 
team of two lawyers and an investigator looked fully 
into Mason's background. Moreover, the state had 
collected and released to the defense in January 1994 
voluminous records concerning Mason, including 
records about his last nine years in and out of prison 
as well as school records and juvenile incarcerations. 
In fact, Mason deliberately chose not to present 
background mitigation evidence to avoid unfavorable 
rebuttal evidence from the state. Thus, Mason has 
again failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion or 
outcome-determinative plain error. 
In sum, we reject Mason's contention that the trial 
court's refusal to provide him with all the experts he 
requested denied him his constitutional or statutory 
rights. 
II 
Suppression of Pretrial Statements 
Mason claims that the trial court erred in refusing to 
suppress statements he made during police interviews 
on February 10 and 12 because police did not advise 
him of his [694 N.E.2d 946] Miranda rights, and 
because his statements were involuntary. Although 
Mason made no directly incriminating statements, his 
pretrial account of his February 8 activities was used 
to demonstrate a conflict with his trial testimony as to 
events relevant to Robin's death. 
[12] On February 10, Detective Dennis Potts 
stopped by Mason's house, drove him to the police 
station, asked him questions for eighteen minutes, 
then drove him home after driving by the Youngs' 
residence. On February 12, Potts again stopped at 
Mason's house and asked whether he would go to the 
police station for further interviews. Mason again 
voluntarily agreed. The ensuing conversations, all 
recorded, began at 11 :29 a.m. and lasted until 3 :24 
p.m. Mason was cooperative and talked freely 
throughout. 
Around 4:00 p.m., police advised Mason of his 
Miranda rights, and his parole officer (who had 
secretly observed the interview) arrested him for 
violating the conditions of his parole by drinking and 
associating with felons. After Mason asked for an 
attorney, police stopped further questioning. 
Until he was told that he was under arrest, 
detectives never told Mason that he could not leave, 
and he was never handcuffed. Mason acknowledged 
that he was left alone two or three times, the door was 
not locked, and that the first time he understood that 
he would be arrested and could not leave was around 
4:00 p.m. 
[13] Only a custodial interrogation triggers the need 
for a Miranda rights warning. Berkemer v. McCarty 
(1984), 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 
317. The evidence supports the trial court's finding 
that Mason was not in custody when questioned. 
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[14] *154 The fact that a suspect is being 
interviewed at a police station does not, per se, 
require a Miranda rights warning. Rather, the 
determination as to whether a custodial interrogation 
has occurred requires an inquiry into "how a 
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have 
understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 
U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d at 336. 
"[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 
'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' 
of the degree associated with a formal arrest." 
California v. Beheler (1983), 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 
103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279, 
quoting Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 429 U.S. 492, 
495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719. 
Since Mason was not in custody, police did not 
violate his Miranda rights. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 
429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714; 
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1123, 103 S.Ct. at 
3519, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1278; State v. Biros (1997), 78 
Ohio St.3d 426, 440, 678 N .E.2d 891, 904. 
[ 15] [16] Moreover, evidence supports the trial 
court's finding that Mason's statements were 
voluntary. A court, in determining whether a pretrial 
statement is involuntary, "should consider the totality 
of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and 
prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, 
intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the 
existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; 
and the existence of threat or inducement." State v. 
Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 3 0.0.3d 18, 358 
N .E.2d 1051, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
In this case, Mason was a thirty-year-old high 
school graduate who had taken some college courses. 
He had two prior felony convictions and was 
experienced with criminal investigations. He was not 
threatened, mistreated, coerced, or wrongfully 
induced to make statements. Moreover, questioning 
on February 10 lasted only eighteen minutes, and the 
February 12 questioning, although spread over four 
hours, included substantial periods of inactivity. 
Under the totality of circumstances, his pretrial 
statements in which he continued to maintain his 
innocence were voluntary. Compare State v. Loza 
(1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 66, 641 N.E.2d 1082, 
1094. 
The trial court did not err in finding that, during the 
initial two interviews on February 10 and February 
12, 1993, the defendant was not in custody and 
therefore the officers were not required to provide 
him with Miranda warnings. Nor did the trial court 
err in finding the statements to have been voluntarily 
made. 
[694 N.E.2d 947] 
III 
Denial of Continuance 
[ 17] Mason argues that the trial court erred in failing 
to grant his counsel's requests for reasonable 
continuances in order to investigate and prepare for 
trial. His claim lacks merit. 
[18] *155 "The grant or denial of a continuance is 
a matter that is entrusted to the broad, sound 
discretion of the trial judge." State v. Unger (1981), 
67 Ohio St.2d 65, 21 0.0.3d 41, 423 N.E.2d 1078, 
syllabus. In both State v. Spirko (1991), 59 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 17, 570 N.E.2d 229, 249, and State v. 
Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 115, 559 N.E.2d at 721, 
this court held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying a continuance despite counsel's 
claims that they needed more time to prepare. In 
State v. Johnson (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 87, 94-95, 24 
OBR 282, 288-289, 494 N.E.2d 1061, 1067-1068, the 
trial court was found to have abused its discretion in 
denying a continuance, but Johnson involved newly 
discovered evidence, a situation not present here. 
On January 19, 1994, the prosecutor released 
approximately three thousand pages of Mason's 
institutional records to defense counsel, which the 
prosecutor claims were not subject to discovery. The 
trial judge stated that after release of the records, both 
the prosecutor and the defendant agreed to May 31, 
1994 as a firm trial date. 
On May 23, 1994, Mason moved for a continuance 
on the basis that the state had disclosed two days 
earlier an additional four hundred eleven pages of 
relevant police investigative reports and witness 
statements. Mason's counsel argued that more time 
was needed to study, analyze, and follow up on this 
mass of information. The court denied the motion on 
May 27. 
At the start of voir dire, on May 31, Mason's lead 
counsel renewed his arguments for a continuance, 
declaring that he was unprepared to go forward and 
would not do so. After hearing his explanations, the 
trial court expressed skepticism as to the legitimacy of 
the need for continuance. When the court threatened 
to remove counsel without pay, counsel agreed to 
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proceed to trial. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that Mason's counsel had been allowed 
adequate time to review the witness's statements, 
police investigative files, and other materials that were 
furnished to him. His two appointed counsel first 
appeared at pretrial hearings in October 1993, eight 
months before trial began on May 31, 1994. 
In addition to two counsel, the trial court also 
granted the defense funds for a trained investigator, a 
psychiatrist, pathologist, and for blood and DNA 
testing. Counsel received additional assistance from 
the State Public Defender's Office. Prior to trial, 
Mason filed more than fifty pretrial motions and 
conducted several pretrial hearings. At trial, he called 
thirty-one witnesses. Contrary to Mason's claim, 
counsel had more than enough time to prepare, and 
the record demonstrates extensive preparation. 
In sum, Mason has not demonstrated that the court 
abused its discretion in denying defense motions for 
continuance made only eight days before the *156 
scheduled trial date and on the morning of trial. Nor 
has Mason demonstrated that his counsel needed more 
time to effectively represent him. 
IV 
Jury Selection Issues 
[19] Mason contends that the trial court and defense 
counsel erred in voir dire by referring to the jury's 
sentences verdict as a recommendation. Although the 
term "recommendation" was used briefly in voir dire 
and in final instructions, the judge and counsel 
generally avoided the term. Further, we have 
previously held that use of the term 
"recommendation" does not constitute error. See, 
e.g., State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 326, 
686 N.E.2d 245, 260-261; State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio 
St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N .E.2d 264, paragraph 
six of the syllabus. In this case, error did occur in 
using the term "recommendation" in reference to a 
possible verdict of a life sentence, as a jury 
recommendation of a life sentence is binding on the 
trial court. But the error is harmless. 
[694 N .E.2d 948] Mason further argues that during 
the jury selection process, the trial judge unduly 
restricted voir dire, the prosecutor engaged in 
prosecutorial misconduct, and Mason's counsel failed 
to provide effective assistance. These claims lack 
merit. 
[20] Mason first argues that the trial court unfairly 
restricted voir dire as to prospective jurors' views 
about race. As Mason points out, Turner v. Murray 
(1986), 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1688, 90 
L.Ed.2d 27, 37, held that a "capital defendant accused 
of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective 
jurors * * *questioned on the issue of racial bias." 
[21] Nonetheless, the Turner court also recognized 
that "the trial judge retains discretion as to the form 
and number of questions on the subject, including the 
decision whether to question the venire individually or 
collectively. See Ham v. South Carolina [1973], 409 
U.S. [524] at 527 [93 S.Ct. 848, 850-851, 35 
L.Ed.2d 46, 50]." Turner, 476 U.S. at 37, 106 S.Ct. 
at 1689, 90 L.Ed.2d at 37. In Ohio, too, the scope of 
voir dire is within a trial court's discretion and varies 
with the circumstances. See State v. Bedford (1988), 
39 Ohio St.3d 122, 129, 529 N.E.2d 913, 920; 
Crim.R. 24(A); R.C. 2945.27. 
In this case, the trial court allowed Mason an 
opportunity to discern racial bias as required by 
Turner v. Murray, supra. Before trial, each juror 
was asked to complete a forty-one-question form, 
specifically designed for this case, which asked 
questions as to their background, experiences, and 
attitudes. 
[22] Moreover, during individual voir dire, the trial 
court allowed prospective jurors to be asked about 
racial prejudice or bias. Admittedly, the trial court 
wanted to defer extensive questioning about racial bias 
to general voir dire. But the trial *157 court has 
discretion over whether to cover this subject in 
individual or general voir dire. Turner, 476 U.S. at 
37, 106 S.Ct. at 1689, 90 L.Ed.2d at 37; State v. 
Brown (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 528 N.E.2d 523, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
In fact, Mason's counsel asked jurors about their 
racial attitudes both during individual and general voir 
dire, which extended into three days. Thus, Mason 
was not denied an opportunity to question jurors on 
racial attitudes. See, also, State v. Durr (1991), 58 
Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 568 N.E.2d 674, 678-679. 
[23] Mason complains because, during individual 
voir dire of juror Crane, the trial judge said, "I agree 
with you there" after Crane remarked that "people are 
sentenced to death, and then they don't do anything 
about it anyhow, so it's not really a deterrent." 
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Previously, the court, in referring to the crimes of 
child murder and rape, stated, "There are certain 
cases that---where the death penalty is proper and, of 
course, that would be one of them. And you're 
saying that you would apply that as one of them?" 
Mason contends that these remarks constituted 
inappropriate comment by the court as to its view of 
the death penalty. 
[24] Although improper, the court's isolated remarks 
to single jurors was largely innocuous, and evoked no 
defense objection. The trial court instructed the jury 
to disregard any "indication of my view on the facts" 
and to disregard, in determining the penalty, any 
"indication of its view of the case." Unless it is 
proven otherwise, the jury is presumed to follow such 
instructions. See State v. Henderson (1988), 39 Ohio 
St.3d 24, 33, 528 N.E.2d 1237, 1246. 
[25) [26) Mason also claims that the prosecutor's 
reference to the "guilt phase" of the trial in individual 
voir dire of six prospective jurors created a 
"presumption of guilt." However, three of them did 
not sit as jurors. Moreover, the prosecutor explained 
to all that the first phase dealt with determining guilt 
or innocence. The first phase of a bifurcated capital 
case may be referred to as the "guilt phase" as a 
convenient abbreviation, rather than using awkward 
terms such as the "guilt or innocence phase" or 
"determination of guilt or innocence" phase. 
[27) Mason also claims his counsel was ineffective 
during jury selection. Yet reversal of a conviction or 
sentence based on ineffective assistance requires 
finding both (a) deficient performance, "errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' [ 694 N. E. 2d 949] guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment," and (b) prejudice, "errors 
* * * so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. 
Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693. Accord State v. 
Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
[28) [29) Mason's complaints mostly amount to 
hindsight views about how current counsel might have 
voir dired the jury differently. However, we will not 
second-guess trial strategy decisions, and "a court 
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional *158 assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. See, 
also, State v. Davis (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 
349-350, 581N.E.2d1362, 1381. 
As to all of Mason's claims of ineffective assistance 
in regard to counsel's performance at voir dire, 
Mason fails to establish prejudice, namely, "that there 
exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for 
counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have 
been different." State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 
538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
[30] [31] [32) Mason argues that the prosecution 
improperly used peremptory challenges to exclude 
prospective jurors based on their opposition to the 
death penalty. But Mason waived the claim when he 
failed to ask for the state's explanation. See State v. 
Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 485, 653 
N .E.2d 304, 317. Moreover, apart from excluding 
jurors based on race or sex, "prosecutors can exercise 
a peremptory challenge for any reason, without 
inquiry, and without a court's control." State v. 
Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 13, 564 N.E.2d 408, 
419; J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994), 511 U.S. 
127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89. Batson v. 
Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 
L.Ed.2d 69, does not extend to peremptory strikes 
against jurors opposed to the death penalty. State v. 
Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 249, 586 N.E.2d 
1042, 1057; State v. Esparza, 39 Ohio St.3d at 
13-14, 529 N.E.2d at 198. 
Thus, Mason's contention that his conviction should 
be reversed based on error in voir dire is rejected. 
v 
Guilt-Phase Issues 
[33) [34) [35) [36] Gruesome Photos. Mason argues 
that the state's use of "cumulative, gruesome, [and] 
inflammatory color photographs" denied him a fair 
trial and due process. Under Evid.R. 403, the 
admission of photographs is left to a trial court's 
sound discretion. State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio 
St.3d 239, 264, 15 OBR 379, 401, 473 N.E.2d 768, 
791. Relevant, nonrepetitive photographs are 
admissible in capital cases, even if gruesome, as long 
as the probative value of each photograph outweighs 
the danger of material prejudice. Id. at paragraph 
seven of the syllabus. 
[37] Mason has failed to show that the trial court 
abused its discretion or that prejudicial impact of any 
of six crime-scene photos of the victim or three 
autopsy photos outweighed its individual probative 
value. These photographs were limited in number, 
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and small (3-1/4 by 5 inches). They are not 
particularly gruesome or inflammatory. Two of the 
crime-scene photos were cumulative, but we find the 
error in admitting both to be harmless. 
*159 The probative value of each photo is apparent. 
The prosecution's theory of the circumstances 
surrounding Robin's death was that a struggle of some 
type had taken place in the victim's car, after which 
the victim escaped and was chased into the abandoned 
building, where she was ultimately raped and 
murdered. The crime-scene photos of Robin's 
battered, bruised, and disrobed body, with her jeans 
and panties pulled below her knees, tend both to prove 
that her death was committed in conjunction with a 
sexual offense and to rebut any inference that Robin 
engaged in consensual sexual activity. Other photos 
portray Robin's injuries and are relevant to proof of 
intent to kill. Finally, the photos are admissible, since 
they illustrate the testimony of the coroner and police. 
Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR [694 N.E.2d 950 
] 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the 
syllabus. 
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in 
admitting the photographs as evidence. 
[38] Improper Transcripts. Mason argues that the 
state's use of "transcripts with clear racially 
derogatory overtones" of his February 1993 police 
interviews in addition to the tapes denied him a fair 
trial. Mason contends that by accurately portraying 
Mason's use of ethnic language, the transcripts 
created "racially derogatory overtones" and were 
"inherently prejudicial." 
[39] Yet Mason failed to object to use of the 
transcripts on this basis, although he had the 
transcripts and knew of their intended use. Had the 
issue been timely raised, revisions to the transcript 
might have been made. Mason waived this issue. 
Evid.R. 103(A)(l). 
Nor does plain error exist. Detective Potts testified 
that the transcripts were accurate, and counsel did not 
suggest otherwise. The jury knew about Mason's 
occasional use of ethnic English, since they had heard 
the tapes. "Where there are no 'material differences' 
between a tape admitted into evidence and a transcript 
given to the jury as a listening aid, there is no 
prejudicial error." State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 445, 588 N.E.2d 819, 835. 
[ 40] Further, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by allowing the transcripts in the jury 
room. The transcripts are useful and easier to 
understand than the tapes. See United States v. 
Rengifo (C.A.1, 1986), 789 F.2d 975. The court 
carefully instructed the jurors, "The transcripts are 
merely an aid to facilitate listening," and if they found 
any difference between the tape and transcript, "[Y]ou 
should disregard the transcript and use your own 
judgment as to what was said * * *." Under the 
circumstances, no prejudicial error occurred. See 
United States v. Costa (C.A.11, 1982), 691 F.2d 
1358, 1362; United States v. Carson (C.A.2, 1972), 
464 F.2d 424, 436-437. 
[41] Exclusion of Evidence of Other Acts of 
Victim's Husband. Mason contends that he was 
prevented from fully defending himself because the 
trial court refused to allow evidence of prior specific 
violent acts of Chris Dennis, Robin's *160 husband. 
Mason contends that this exclusion hindered him in 
supporting his claim that Robin's murder had been 
committed by her husband. Mason argues that the 
trial court wrongfully excluded evidence that Chris 
Dennis (a) beat up a Chris Lyons and left him 
unconscious in a remote area in 1989, (b) attacked 
Ben Audin with a machete, and (c) struck his prior 
wife in the face. 
[42] Yet evidence that Chris Dennis had allegedly 
committed specific acts of violence was not 
admissible. Subject to certain exceptions, Evid.R. 
404(A) provides, "Evidence of a person's character or 
a trait of his character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion * * *." 
None of the exceptions listed in Evid.R. 404(A) is 
applicable. 
[43] Mason argues that the exceptions to Evid.R. 
404(A) should be expanded because Chris Dennis was 
not on trial. According to Mason, Evid.R. 404 should 
not apply to witnesses or alternate suspects. But 
Evid.R. 404, by its terms, applies to all character 
evidence, not simply to persons accused of crimes. 
Mason was allowed to present some evidence that 
tended to show the criminal propensity of Chris 
Dennis. One witness testified that Chris had knocked 
Robin's head against the dashboard of her car at a 
New Year's Eve party, and a second testified that she 
had seen Chris bloody Robin's face before she got 
into the car at this party. The court allowed this 
defense evidence to explain blood later found in the 
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car. The first also commented on Chris's tendency 
for violence. The defense also questioned Chris about 
his heavy drinking and his fights with Robin. 
The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
allow evidence as to other specific acts of Chris 
Dennis, nor were Mason's constitutional rights 
violated thereby. See, generally, Annotation, 
Admissibility of Evidence of Commission of Similar 
Crime by One Other[694 N.E.2d 951] Than Accused 
(1994), 22 A.LR.5th 1; Winfield v. United States 
(D.C.App.1996), 676 A.2d 1; United States v. 
McCourt (C.A.9, 1991), 925 F.2d 1229, 1236, fn. 12. 
[44] [45] Guilt phase instructions. Mason argues 
that the trial court erred by "instructing the jury that it 
must first determine that Mason was not guilty * * * 
of aggravated murder" before considering whether he 
was guilty of murder. Yet Mason failed to object at 
trial and thus waived all but plain error. Crim.R. 
30(A); State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 
3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus. 
The trial court instructed the jury: "If you find the 
Defendant not guilty of Aggravated Murder, you will 
then continue with your deliberations and determine 
whether or not the State of Ohio proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the 
lesser crime of murder." 
*161 We have held that instructions similar to those 
given here are not "acquittal first" instructions and did 
not constitute plain error. State v. Allen (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 626, 638, 653 N.E.2d 675, 687; cf. State 
v. Thomas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 
286, paragraph three of the syllabus. Moreover, 
since the jury found Mason guilty of raping Robin 
Dennis, it could not reasonably have found him not 
guilty of felony murder but guilty only of murder. 
The jury would have convicted Mason of aggravated 
murder rather than the lesser included offense of 
murder even if given the lesser included offense 
option. Cf. Allen, 73 Ohio St.3d at 637-638, 653 
N.E.2d at 686-687. Hence, assuming arguendo that 
error was committed, that error was necessarily 
harmless. 
Thus, Mason's contention that his conviction should 
be reversed based on guilt-phase evidentiary rulings 
and instructions is rejected. 
VI 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Mason claims pervasive prosecutorial misconduct 
during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, 
focusing on the state's cross-examination of him and 
final guilt-phase and penalty-phase arguments. 
[46] Determination of whether improper remarks 
constitute prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct 
requires analysis as to (1) whether the remarks were 
improper and, (2) if so, whether the remarks 
prejudicially affected the accused's substantial rights. 
State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 
317, 318, 470 N.E.2d 883, 885. 
[47] During cross-examination of Mason, the state 
highlighted differences between his pretrial statements 
and his testimony. For example, in his pretrial 
statements, Mason claimed that he scarcely knew 
Robin and had never been alone with her. At trial, 
Mason asserted that she voluntarily had sex with him 
the morning of her death, thereby directly 
contradicting his pretrial statements. On cross-
examination, over objection, the prosecutor asked 
Mason whether, consistent with his pretrial claims, he 
had his "attorneys do independent DNA testing to see 
if our [the state's] DNA results were right?" 
Under the circumstances, the state could remark on 
the differences between Mason's pretrial statement 
and his trial testimony and on the defense's decision 
to "switch strategies," and contrast his earlier denials 
and challenge to DNA testing with Mason's trial 
testimony that he had sex with Robin that day. By 
commenting on Mason's earlier lies to police, the 
prosecutor was not penalizing Mason for exercising 
his rights. See State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 
110, 559 N.E.2d at 716-717. 
[48] [49] *162 Admittedly, the state's remark in 
the final guilt-phase argument that Mason's counsel 
"tried to cloud the issues, tried to confuse" may have 
denigrated defense counsel. See State v. Keenan 
(1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 406, 613 N.E.2d 203, 
207. Yet counsel failed to object to any of the 
prosecutor's final guilt-phase argument. Thus, he 
waived all but plain error. State v. Wade (1978), 53 
Ohio St.2d 182, 7 0.0.3d 362, 373 N.E.2d 1244, 
paragraph one of the syllabus; Crim.R. 52(B). No 
plain error exists. Here, as in Landrum, when 
"viewed in its total context, the prosecutor's final 
argument was reasoned, logical, and not emotional." 
State [694 N.E.2d 952] v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 
111, 559 N.E.2d at 717. 
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[50] [51] [52] Additionally, the state could point out 
the weakness in defense claims that Mason and Robin 
were romantically involved. The state could also 
remark on the inconsistency between Mason's attack 
on eyewitness testimony and his own reliance upon 
doubtful eyewitness testimony. "Prosecutors are 
entitled to latitude as to what the evidence has shown 
and what inferences can reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence." State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 
111, 684 N.E.2d 668, 689. 
[53] [54] The state did characterize Mason's 
testimony that police planted his keys in the victim's 
car as preposterous, but scene photos and the ensuing 
disassembly of the car proved that police never 
planted this evidence. "A prosecutor may state his 
opinion if it is based on the evidence presented at 
trial." State v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1, 10, 
572 N.E.2d 97, 106. 
[55] [56] The prosecutor did assert that the police 
"did an outstanding job" in their investigation, and 
thereby improperly vouched for the police. However, 
we do not find that prejudicial error resulted from the 
prosecutor's remarks, particularly in light of defense 
counsel's repeated cnt1c1sm of the police 
investigation. Where a prosecutorial statement not 
supported by admitted evidence is "short, oblique, and 
justified as a reply to defense arguments and elicits no 
contemporaneous objection, there is no prejudicial 
error." State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 166, 
555 N.E.2d 293, 300. 
In view of the weight of evidence of Mason's guilt, 
none of the remarks Mason now complains about 
constituted plain error. Nor as to issues preserved, 
such as the cross-examination about DNA, were his 
rights materially prejudiced. 
[57] Mason argues misconduct during the 
prosecution's closing penalty phase argument, but 
again his failure to object to remarks now complained 
about waives all but plain error. State v. Wade, 53 
Ohio St.2d 182, 7 0.0.3d 362, 373 N.E.2d 1244, 
paragraph one of the syllabus; Crim.R. 52(B). 
[58] No plain error or impropriety exists. The 
prosecutor's sentencing argument was restrained, 
noninflammatory, and based upon evidence before the 
court. Contrary to Mason's claims, the prosecutor 
correctly identified the aggravating circumstance and 
never attempted to make the murder an aggravating 
circumstance. *163 "Moreover, the prosecutor 
could legitimately refer to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, both to refute any 
suggestion that they were mitigating and to explain 
why the specified aggravatingcircumstance * * * 
outweighed mitigating factors." State v. Combs 
(1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 283, 581 N.E.2d 1071, 
1077. 
[59] [60] [61] The prosecutor could properly 
minimize the importance of Mason's good conduct in 
jail, his artistic ability, and family opinions that 
Mason should avoid the death penalty, and comment 
upon the paucity of relevant mitigating evidence. 
"Prosecutors can urge the merits of their cause and 
legitimately argue that defense mitigation evidence is 
worthy of little or no weight." State v. Wilson (1996), 
74 Ohio St.3d 381, 399, 659 N.E.2d 292, 309. 
[62] [63] [64] Since Mason relied upon residual 
doubt, the prosecutor could comment that defense 
explanations seemed "far fetched." A prosecutor can 
respond to issues raised by an accused. State v. 
Lundgren, 73 Ohio St.3d at 491, 653 N.E.2d at 322. 
The prosecutor did not exceed limits by noting that 
Mason made an unsworn statement on which he could 
not be cross-examined. State v. Gumm (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 413, 653 N.E.2d 253, syllabus ("counsel 
for the state may comment upon the defendant's 
unsworn statement, if any"). 
VII 
Sufficiency of Evidence 
Mason attacks the sufficiency of evidence to support 
his conviction for rape, aggravated murder during a 
rape, and the death-penalty specification that the 
murder occurred in the course of rape. 
[65] [66] In a review for sufficiency following a 
conviction, the evidence must be considered[694 
N .E.2d 953] in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 
259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
"[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the 
credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier 
of the facts." State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 
0.0.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
[67] The evidence was such that the jury could 
reasonably find Mason guilty of rape, aggravated 
felony-murder based upon rape, and the death-penalty 
specification alleging rape. First, sexual penetration 
was clearly evidenced by the presence of Mason's 
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semen in Robin's body. Thus, cases finding 
insufficient evidence of rape or attempted rape due to 
the lack of evidence of actual or attempted sexual 
penetration are inapposite. See, e.g., State v. Davis 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 114, 666 N.E.2d 1099, 
1107. 
[68] Second, the element of force was supported by 
evidence of a struggle in Robin's car, and the fact that 
her jeans and panties were found pulled down *164 
below her knees. In addition, the evidence indicated 
use of force in that Robin had been both strangled and 
beaten. In other cases, similar evidence was sufficient 
to prove the element of force. See State v. McGuire 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 396, 686 N .E.2d 1112, 
1118; State v. Williams (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 
576, 660 N.E.2d 724, 732; State v. Scudder (1994), 
71 Ohio St.3d 263, 274, 643 N.E.2d 524, 533. 
[69] The jury had the right to believe the testimony 
of the state's witnesses and disbelieve Mason as to his 
activities on the date of Robin's disappearance. The 
record includes evidence that Robin and Mason left a 
private residence together in Robin's car in the early 
afternoon of February 8, 1993, that Robin's 
abandoned car was observed at approximately 4:30 
that afternoon within walking distance of where her 
body was found, that a man matching Mason's 
description was seen in the same general area later 
that afternoon by two separate witnesses, and that 
Robin's husband Chris, who Mason contended was 
the murderer, was passed out drunk from early on the 
afternoon of February 8 until well after dark on that 
day. This evidence is sufficient to support the jury's 
conclusion that it was Mason who battered and killed 
Robin Dennis. 
Mason's argument that his conviction should be 
reversed based on insufficiency of the evidence is 
rejected. 
VIII 
Penalty-Phase Instructions 
Mason argues that the trial court repeatedly erred in 
instructing the jury. 
[70] Voir Dire Instructions. Mason notes that in 
preliminary voir dire instructions, the trial judge 
stated that if Mason were found guilty, a second 
hearing would occur to consider sentence, but failed 
to tell the jury how it would determine whether to 
recommend death and implied that a finding of guilty 
on any charge could warrant the death penalty. 
[71] Because Mason failed to contemporaneously 
object, error, if any, is waived, unless rising to the 
level of plain error. State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio 
St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N .E.2d 1332, syllabus. 
Despite Mason's complaint, the trial judge need not at 
that early stage completely instruct the jury, for 
example, by defining "aggravating circumstances" and 
"mitigating factors." The context of an instruction 
must be considered. State v. Price (1979), 60 Ohio 
St.2d 136, 14 0.0.3d 379, 398 N.E.2d 772, 
paragraph four of syllabus. We find no plain error. 
[72] Failure to Define Mitigating Factors. The court 
instructed the jury to consider "mitigating factors 
including, but not limited to, the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history, 
character, and background of the Defendant, and any 
other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether 
the *165 Defendant should be sentenced to death." 
Although the trial judge did not specifically define the 
term "mitigating factors," the instructions, considered 
as a whole, adequately guided the jury and did not 
restrict its consideration of mitigating evidence. See 
State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 397, 659 N.E.2d at 
308; State v. Murphy (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 554, 
577, 605 N.E.2d [694 N.E.2d 954] 884, 903; State v. 
Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 122, 559 N.E.2d at 
727-728. 
[73] Guilt-phase Evidence. The trial judge did not 
err in instructing the jury to consider testimony and 
exhibits "relevant to the aggravating circumstances 
and the mitigating factors which are admitted into 
evidence in the first phase of this case" in their 
penalty deliberations. The prosecutor at the penalty 
phase may introduce any evidence from the guilt 
phase relevant to the aggravating circumstances. 
State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 528 
N.E.2d 542, paragraph one of the syllabus. In State 
v. Woodard (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 70, 78, 623 
N.E.2d 75, 81, the court recognized that all exhibits 
from a trial's guilt phase "were relevant to the death 
penalty specifications * * * and to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense." Further, by relying 
upon residual doubt in arguing against the death 
penalty, Mason invited reconsideration of all guilt 
phase evidence. 
[74] Appeal. The trial court instructed the jury, 
over objection, that Mason's "right to appeal his 
conviction will not be limited in any way by your 
imposition of the death sentence. Secondly, you 
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should not consider the subject of appeal in 
determining sentence." Mason provoked this 
instruction when he declared, in his unsworn 
statement, "[A]ll I'm asking for is you guys to not 
sentence me to death and give me one of the life 
sentences, so I will have a chance to bring this to 
Appeal Courts * * *. [G]ive me the chance to take it 
through the Appeals Courts * * *." The court's 
instruction was appropriate, accurately reflected the 
law, and did not diminish the jury's sense of its 
importance. Compare State v. Phillips (1995), 74 
Ohio St.3d 72, 101, 656 N.E.2d 643, 669; State v. 
Rogers (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 427, 28 OBR 480, 504 
N.E.2d 52, paragraph one of the syllabus, reversed 
other grounds (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 70, 512 N.E.2d 
581. 
(75] Aggravating Circumstances. The trial court did 
err in referring to "aggravating circumstances," when 
only a single aggravating circumstance existed. 
Nonetheless, this slip of the tongue did not constitute 
plain error, particularly as the trial court identified for 
the jury a single aggravating circumstance of felony-
murder. 
(76] (77] Mercy/Residual Doubt. Despite Mason's 
claims, the trial court need not instruct on mercy. 
State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 638, 653 
N.E.2d 675, 687; State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio 
St.3d 414, 417, 613 N.E.2d 212, 216. Nor need the 
court instruct on residual doubt. State v. McGuire, 80 
Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N .E.2d 1112, syllabus. 
*166 Mason's contention that his conviction should 
be reversed based on error in instructions to the jury 
is rejected. 
IX 
Juror Bias/Deadlock/Misconduct 
(78] Juror Bias. Mason argues that he was denied a 
fair trial by an all-white jury because of racial 
prejudice. 
In a hearing on a new trial motion, an alternate juror 
testified that during the trial after two or three days, 
some jurors made remarks she considered racist. An 
impaneled juror testified to hearing "racist remarks 
[said in] a jive manner," but stated that it had no 
impact on her or other jurors. 
The overall record suggests that any such comments 
were isolated and did not demonstrate that the jury 
was racially prejudiced or that Mason was denied a 
fair trial. Eleven jurors in affidavits all denied 
participating in or observing any racism. After 
considering the evidence, the trial judge concluded 
that "[a]t no time during the trial did any of the jurors 
participate in any acts of racism which could have 
impaired the Defendant's ability to receive a fair 
trial." No reason exists to disturb the trial court's 
finding. 
[79] Jury Deadlock. Mason argues that if the jury 
reports a sentencing-phase deadlock, the court must 
then instruct the jury to consider only life sentences 
and cannot allow continued death-penalty 
deliberations. 
After approximately four and one-half hours of 
deliberations at the penalty phase, the jury sent out a 
note stating, "We are unable to reach a unanimous 
decision on any one of the sentencing options. Please 
advise (694 N .E.2d 955] * * *." Over defense 
objection, the trial judge then instructed the jury to 
continue deliberations but also instructed them, "If 
you decide that you cannot agree and that further 
deliberations will not serve a useful purpose, you may 
ask to be returned to the courtroom * * *." See State 
v. Howard (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 18, 537 N.E.2d 
188. 
The trial court then asked the foreman whether there 
was "a possibility * * * that after an additional period 
of time you may reach an agreement * * * [after] 
considering * * * the instructions?" The foreman 
answered "No," but he agreed to discuss with other 
jurors and "then return and respond to that question." 
At 5:00 p.m., the jury sent a note that they had made 
"some progress" and that it was "best to adjourn for 
the evening & resume fresh in the AM. " After 
returning the next morning, the jury indicated after 
thirty minutes or so that they had reached a verdict. 
[80] In State v. Springer (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 167, 
170, 586 N.E.2d 96, 99, the court recognized that 
Ohio's death-penalty statutes do "not contemplate the 
possibility *167 of a hung jury in the penalty phase 
of a capital murder trial." Hence, "[w]hen a jury 
becomes irreconcilably deadlocked during its 
sentencing deliberations * * * the trial court is 
required" to impose an appropriate life sentence. Id. 
at syllabus. In view of Springer, Mason argues that 
the court erred by using a modified Howard charge, 
and contends that the court "should have told them to 
consider the two life options or should have sentenced 
Mason itself." 
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[81] No exact line can be drawn as to how long a 
jury must deliberate in the penalty phase before a trial 
court should instruct the jury to limit itself to the life 
sentence options or take the case away from the jury, 
as done in Springer. Each case must be decided 
based upon the particular circumstances. Here, after 
only four and one-half hours of deliberations, the trial 
court acted appropriately by giving a modified 
Howard charge. The circumstances show that the 
jury was not irreconcilably deadlocked, and the 
modified Howard charge did not coerce a death 
verdict. 
[82] Further, this court has approved using 
supplemental instructions urging jurors to continue 
deliberations to try to reach a unanimous penalty 
verdict. See, e.g., State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio 
St.3d 24, 26, 553 N.E.2d 576, 582-583. Such 
supplemental instructions to a jury considering the 
death penalty do not violate due process. Lowenjield 
v. Phelps (1988), 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 
L.Ed.2d 568. 
[83] Jury Misconduct. Mason argues jury 
misconduct and contends that the trial court's reliance 
on the aliunde rule, Evid.R. 606(B) (limiting evidence 
about jury's deliberation), denied him a fair trial. The 
aliunde principle protects the privacy of a jury's 
deliberations from inquiry and promotes the finality of 
jury verdicts. See State v. Adams (1943), 141 Ohio 
St. 423, 25 0.0. 570, 48 N.E.2d 861. 
After receiving evidence at a hearing held on a 
motion for new trial filed by Mason, the trial court 
found insufficient evidence that any juror "had failed 
to keep an open mind so as to be able to fairly decide 
* * * this case." The trial court further found that all 
jurors "were awake and attentive during all 
proceedings of the trial," and that the actions of one 
juror in "reporting * * * that she had disassembled 
her husband's revolver did not influence the verdict * 
* * [and Mason] was not prejudiced by this conduct." 
As to all of Mason's claims of misconduct, he has 
failed to establish any prejudice arising from the 
asserted misconduct. See Crim.R. 33(A); Staie v. 
Hipkins (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 80, 83, 23 0.0.3d 
123, 125, 430 N.E.2d 943, 945-946. 
[84] [85] At the post-trial hearing, Mason also 
wanted to inquire into jury deliberations especially on 
the death penalty. Yet the trial court correctly ruled 
that Mason had presented no evidence of outside 
influences so as to avoid Evid.R. 606(B). No 
exception to the aliunde rule of evidence is 
appropriate simply for murder cases. Mason does not 
have a constitutional right to know the nature of jury 
*168 discussions during deliberations. Thus, 
Mason's contentions lack merit and are rejected. 
[694 N.E.2d 956] 
x 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
[86] Guilt Phase. Mason complains that his counsel 
was ineffective in that he disclosed to the jury that 
Mason was on parole when arrested on February 12, 
and that his parole was thereafter revoked. 
Yet the disclosure may well have been made for 
tactical reasons. Mason's defense theory was that 
police rushed to judgment and did not adequately 
investigate Robin's murder because Mason was on 
parole. Moreover, the state would inevitably have 
proved Mason's felony convictions to impeach his 
credibility as a witness. Evid.R. 609. Further, the 
state could prove both convictions, since Mason was 
charged with having a weapon under disability. R.C. 
2923 .13(A)(2) and (3). Mason simply took the sting 
out of the evidence by early disclosure. State v. 
Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d at 34, 553 N.E.2d at 590. 
As to other aspects of his counsel's guilt-phase 
performance, no ineffectiveness has been 
demonstrated, and Mason's complaints lack merit. 
Trial counsel presented a strong, vigorous, thorough, 
and aggressive defense before and during the trial. 
Counsel also developed a "coherent and consistent 
defense theory" that Mason was innocent and Chris 
Dennis was guilty. See State v. Ballew (1996), 76 
Ohio St.3d 244, 256, 667 N.E.2d 369, 381. Mason's 
conviction demonstrates that the jury simply accepted 
the state's interpretation of the evidence, and rejected 
the theory presented by the defense. Counsel's 
performance did not fall "below an objective standard 
of reasonable representation." State v. Bradley, 42 
Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of 
the syllabus. We have reviewed each of a number of 
instances Mason claims illustrate ineffective assistance 
of counsel and find nothing reflecting "errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. 
Nor has Mason brought forth any conduct on the 
part of his counsel demonstrating prejudice, "that 
there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not 
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for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have 
been different." State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 
538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
[87] Penalty Phase. Mason argues that his counsel 
failed to investigate and present a life history of 
Mason and his psychological background so that he 
would not receive the death penalty. Mason also 
complains about the paucity of mitigation evidence 
presented in defense. 
*169 The record, however, suggests that defense 
counsel had voluminous records about his history and 
background. Counsel prepared twelve exhibits 
documenting aspects of Mason's childhood, such as 
reports that he was beaten by his father and released 
by his parents to juvenile authorities, as well as early 
psychological evaluations, but did not present them to 
the jury. Mason argues that these exhibits show that a 
cogent, persuasive mitigation case could have been 
built revealing Mason's childhood exposure to 
violence, his dysfunctional family, and his early 
emotional and psychological problems. 
But the records also show prior involvements with 
the criminal and juvenile justice systems, and other 
unfavorable matters. Mason could not have presented 
evidence as to his good character and rehabilitation 
potential without risking the introduction of negative 
evidence by the state in rebuttal. 
[88] Similarly it was not an unreasonable strategic 
decision to refrain from presenting the video 
deposition of psychiatrist Dr. Spare in order to avoid 
rebuttal by evidence of Mason's behavioral problel,Tls, 
character deficiencies, and poor potential for 
rehabilitation. We will not second-guess the strategic 
decisions counsel made at trial even though appellate 
counsel now argue that they would have defended 
differently. State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 
388, 513 N .E.2d 754, 762. 
Nor has Mason shown prejudice, the second 
Strickland requirement, namely "a reasonable 
probability" that different tactical choices at the 
penalty phase would have made a difference in the 
result. See State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 
N .E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
[694 N .E.2d 957] 
XI 
Constitutionality 
Mason's attack on the constitutionality of Ohio's 
death-penalty statute is surnrnarily rejected. State v. 
Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 
264; State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 
N.E.2d 568, syllabus. 
XII 
Independent Sentence Evaluation 
Sentencing Evidence. Mason's mother, older 
brother, who was a prison guard, and his older sister 
all testified on Mason's behalf and pleaded with the 
jury not to impose the death penalty. His mother said 
he was a good son, and she loved him deeply. His 
sister also loved him very much and thought Mason 
was not a bad person. 
A cousin testified that she believed the state's 
correctional system had failed Mason and that he 
deserved another chance to be rehabilitated. Two 
deputy sheriffs testified that while Mason had been in 
jail for over a year, he had not been a problem as an 
inmate even on escorted trips. 
*170 His wife, Terry Mason, pleaded with the jury 
"not to kill" Mason. She testified that Mason was her 
reason for living and without him she could not go on. 
On cross-examination, Terry agreed that Mason was 
not at home when she arrived there around 4: 15 p.m. 
on February 8, 1993. Mason came home around 5:30 
p.m., then left, and did not return until later that 
night. Mason had done some drawings that his wife 
and others thought showed great artistic promise. 
In an unsworn statement, Mason begged for his life 
on the basis that he had not killed Robin. He wanted 
a life sentence so he would "have a chance to bring 
this to Appeal Courts, * * * [which would] weigh the 
evidence all over again, and see that I didn't have 
nothing to do with that girl's death." Further, Mason 
said, "I know, God knows, and everybody who knows 
me knows, I don't have to answer to you guys no 
more. I already answered to him." 
[89] Sentence Evaluation. After independent 
assessment, we find that the evidence is sufficient to 
prove the aggravating circumstance of felony-murder. 
As to possible mitigating factors, nothing in the 
nature and circumstances of the offense appears 
mitigating. 
Mason's history and background provide a few 
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mitigating features. His wife, mother, and other 
family members love him and do not want him 
executed. Also, he may have artistic talent. 
At trial, Mason relied upon residual doubt. In the 
syllabus to State v. McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 
N. E. 2d 1112, however, this court held that residual 
doubt can no longer be deemed a mitigating factor. 
Mason's adjustment to jail is a mitigating factor, but 
no other features of this case appear as mitigating 
"other factors" under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 
The aggravating circumstance outweighs the 
extremely modest Illltlgating factors presented. 
Mason was convicted of raping Robin Dennis, 
strangling her, and beating her to death. Even when 
considered collectively, the mitigating factors are not 
of great weight. Thus, the specified aggravating 
circumstance outweighs the mitigation beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and the death penalty is appropriate. 
[90] We find that that death sentence in the case at 
bar is proportionate to penalties in other cases we 
have reviewed. See, e.g., State v. McGuire, 80 Ohio 
St.3d 390, 686 N .E.2d 1112 (mitigation evidence of 
turbulent childhood); State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 
at 104-106, 656 N.E.2d at 671-672 (nineteen year old, 
no significant criminal record, hard worker, low 
intelligence, deprived childhood); State v. Gumm, 73 
Ohio St.3d at 432, 653 N.E.2d at 270 (deprived 
childhood, retardation, no criminal history). 
Imposing the death penalty in this case is neither 
excessive nor disproportionate when compared with 
similar felony-murder cases. See McGuire, Phillips, 
*171. Gumm, supra; State v. Durr, 58 Ohio St.3d 
86, 568 N .E.2d 674; State v. Henderson, 39 Ohio 
St.3d 24, 528 N.E.2d 1237; State v. Apanovitch 
(1987), [694 N.E.2d 958] 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 514 
N.E.2d 394; State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 
OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383. 
Accordingly, Mason's convictions and death 
sentence are affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, 
Sr., PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
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